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PAYING THE PRICE FOR VIETNAM:
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIORt
C. PETER ERLINDER *
[T]hroughout the country, . . . Vietnam veterans, especially those who served
in heavy combat, bear to this day more symptoms of psychological distress
than other Vietnam era veterans or than comparable men who were not in the
military during the years of the Vietnam war. These symptoms, called "stress
reactions," were more intense and more likely to persist among men whose
position in our society makes them least able to cope — blacks and other
minority members, the unemployed or the irregularly employed, the poor,
and men with varying levels of stability in their families when they were
children.'
Many psychological and behavioral problems existing among Vietnam veterans may
be attributed to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Although estimates of the
number of Vietnam combat veterans who suffer from PTSD vary from as few as 500,000
to as many as 1,500,000, 2 it has become increasingly clear that a substantial number of
those who served in Vietnam continue to feel the psychological after-effects of their
wartime experiences." The behavior associated with PTSD not only presents diagnostic
t Copyright C. Peter Erlinder 1984
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minn. The author, along with
Prof. David Thomas of Chicago-Kent College of Law, was attorney of record in People v. lead Wood,
one of the first cases in which PTSD was successfully presented as a defense in May, 1982. As a
consultant or expert witness. Prof. Erlinder has participated in several PTSD cases and has presented
numerous seminars to both attorneys and mental health experts on the application of PTSD to legal
issues.
The author is indebted to Jennifer Webb, J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 1985, for her
assistance in the preparation of this article. This article is an expansion of an article by the author
published at 1 BEIIAV. Sci. & LAW No. 3, 25 (1983). The section on litigation strategy is drawn from a
presentation by the author at The First National Symposium on Vietnam Veterans, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder and the Law sponsored by William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minn.. May 21 and 22,
1983.
Egendorf, Kad ushin, Laufer, Rothbart, & Sloan, Legacies of Vietnam: Comparative Adjustment of
Veterans and Their Peers, Final Report to the Veterans Administration, Mar. 1981, at 49 (hereinafter
cited as Egendorfl. The foregoing quotation is one of the conclusions of the most comprehensive
study of the impact of Vietnam service upon veterans undertaken to this date. The Center for Policy
Research interviewed and studied nearly 1400 Vietnam veterans under the auspices of the Veterans
Administration (V.A.). The results of that report remain the major source of data regarding the
status of Vietnam veterans. Id. See also Black Vietnam Vets: Study Says They Suffer More, 2 National
Leader, Aug. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
of the approximately three million veterans who served in Vietnam, 57,000 were killed and
153,000 were wounded or injured. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM ERA VETERANS,
H.R. REP. No. 38, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 12 (1979). For estimates on the number of veterans who may
need psychiatric help, see generally Walker & Cavenar, Vietnam Veterans: Their Problems Continue, 170
J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 174 (1982).
3 See generally STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREAT-
MENT (C. Figley ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as S'T'RESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS);
STRANGERS AT HOME: VIETNAM VETERANS SINCE THE WAR (Figley & LeVantman ed. 1980).
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and treatment issues for mental health professionals,' but may have legal implications as
There are indications that PTSD is receiving increased attention in the legal commu-
nity.6
 Nevertheless, its application to legal issues is far from widespread. Until very
recently, few mental health professionals, and even fewer attorneys understood PTSD or
its symptoms.' This lack of understanding, combined with the inability or reluctance of
many veterans to discuss their Vietnam experiences, 8
 has made it extremely difficult for
attorneys to discover and prove the link between PTSD and client behavior. 8 As a result,
many attorneys may fail to recognize that various client problems ranging from criminal
charges and substance abuse, to family problems and employment disputes may he
related to PTSD , and to service in Vietnam.°
The enhanced awareness of PTSD, its effect on veterans, and its role in the legal
• PTSD has apparently been the subject of misdiagnosis and improper treatment due to the
similarity between PTSD symptoms and other disorders, the clinician's lack of familiarity with
combat situations, and the relatively recent recognition of PTSD by the American Psychiatric
Association (APA). Schulz, Trauma, Crime and the Affirmative Defense, 11 COLO. LAW. 2401, 2403
(1982). See Walker & Cavenar, supra note 2, at 175; Nash & Walker, Stress Disorders in Vietnam
Returnees: The Problem Continues, 146 MILITARY MED. 582 (1981). This was precisely the problem
illustrated in People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, lll. , May 5, 1982) (discussed infra
at note 56).
• It has been estimated that 25% of those who saw heavy combat have been charged with a
criminal offense. Schulz, supra note 4, at 2401. Alcohol and substance abuse problems among
veterans have also been found to he related to combat experience. See R. LAUFER, T. YAGER, E.
FREY-WOULERS, J. DONNF.I.LAN, 3 LEGACIES OF VIETNAM 51 (Mar. 1981). See also Park, Adjustment
Differences Among Male Substance Abusers Varying in Degrees of Combat Experience in Vietnam, J. CONSULT-
ING & CLINICAL Psvciroi,00v 426 (1981); Schulz, supra note 4, at 2407. There are also a number of
implications in the context of the family. See Figley, Delayed Stress Response Syndrome: Family Therapy
Indications, J. or MARRIAGE & FAM. COONS., July 1978, at 53; Vietnam Combat Linked to Crime, Chi.
Sun-Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at 32, col. 3.
▪ See generally Schulz, .supra note 4; Note, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder —Opening Pandora's Box?,
17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 91 (1982); Milstein & Snyder, PTSD, The War is Over, the Battle Goes On, 19 TRIAL.
MAG., Jan. 1983, at 86; Jack, The Vietnam Connection: Charles Heads Verdict, 9 Cam. DEF., No. 1 at 7
(1980); The "Bombshell" Defense, Nat. L.J., May 12, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Ford, In Defense of the Defenders:
The Vietnam Vet Syndrome, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 434 (1983); Erlinder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,
Vietnam Veterans and the Law, 1 BEHAV, Sci. & LAW, No. 3 at 25 (1983) (available from Van Nostrand
Rheinhold Pub. Co., N.Y., N.Y.); Larson, Vietnam Stress Disorder Defense, GUILD No-Fes, Sept.-Oct.•
1983, at 16, col. 2. In addition, the First National Symposium on PTSD and the Law was held on May 21
and 22, 1983 at William Mitchell College of law, St. Paul, Minn. A two-volume set of materials from
the Symposium is available from the College.
▪ See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. As recently as September 1983, judges and
attorneys have had difficulty finding any case law that would support the validity of PTSD as a
diagnostic or forensic tool. One court stated that "The 'Vietnam Stress Syndrome' is a new theory of
defense. Neither party cites to a case in which this theory was utilized .... [C]learly this 'Vietnam Stress
Syndrome' is a novel theory of defense." Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D. 1983) (emphasis
added). One major purpose of this article is to make such misapprehensions less likely in the future.
t Many Vietnam veterans are reluctant to seek assistance and feel mistrust for authority figures
or fear being stigmatized. See generally Figley & Sprenkle, Delayed Stress Syndrome: Family Therapy
Implications, J. of MARRIAGE AND FAM. COONS., July 1971, at 54.
9 See generally The "Bombshell" Defense, supra note 6; Vietnam Stress Defense A Winner in Drug Case,
Nat. L.J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 4, col. 4; Jack, supra note 6, at 7; Ford, In Defense of the Defenders: The Vietnam
Vet Syndrome, 19 CRIM. L. BuLt,. 434 (1983). See infra notes 151-85.
'° See supra notes 4 & 5.
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process has not developed without controversy. Vietnam veterans have suffered from a
stereotypical image as disturbed individuals." This fact, when coupled with the sensa-
tional publicity surrounding the use of psychological defenses, such as that which arose
out of the trial of presidential assailant. John Hinckley, has called into question the
propriety of raising issues such as PTSD." Furthermore, the fear is often expressed that
the use of PTSD in the courtroom will give Vietnam veterans a "blank check" to commit
crimes or other antisocial acts." Even health care professionals who are supportive of
veteran's issues are concerned that p-rsD may be misused by overzealous attorneys who
attempt to stretch the diagnosis beyond scientifically justifiable limits."
The task facing attorneys and mental health professionals is to develop an under-
standing of PTSD that allows its application to legal issues when appropriate, while
avoiding potential abuses. The best way to prevent abuse or misapplication is for attor-
neys and mental health professionals to be thoroughly educated about the nature of the
disorder and how it may affect client behavior.
The purpose of this article is to add to the growing body of knowledge that is helping
to demystify PTSD as a legal/ psychological phenomenon." The article begins with a brief
description of the symptoms characteristic of PTSD' 6 and a history of the scientific
understanding of the disorder. Next, a number of cases in which PTSD has been a factor
are reviewed and some solutions to strategic problems posed by PTSD in criminal
litigation." The article then discusses the application of PTSD in other contexts, including
plea negotiations, sentencing, and post-conviction relief." The article concludes that
proper legal representation of veteran clients requires sensitivity to PTSD in issues of
client behavior and that the legal system must be allowed to take PTSD into account,
where it exists, to resolve adequately the legal issues raised by PTSD-relined conduct.
" in Search of Peace, Chi. Trib., Jan. 17, 1984, Sec. 3, at 12, col. I.
12 Stress Defenses Total Nonsense, Hammond Ind. Times, May 11, 1982, at 2, col. 1; Crimmins, Vet
Says Piet Nerves Made Him Kill Foreman, Chi. -Frib., Jan. 24, 1982, at 6, col. I. See infra note 236.
13 See supra note 12. Testimony in at least one trial indicates that a veteran may have erroneously
believed that such a "blank check" may have existed. See State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 1'.2d
1092, 1094 (1983). In Simonson, the Supreme Court of New Mexico refused to grant a retrial where
the jury heard inadmissible testimony that the defendant planned to kill the victim and blame it on
his Vietnam service. 669 P.2d at 1095-96. The witness was never cross-examined on that statement.
Id. Compare supra note 12 and infra note 236. The testimony of a psychiatrist called by the State was
held inadmissible because the defense had not had a chance to depose the witness or to evaluate his
notes in preparation for trial. 669 P.2d at 1095. Furthermore there is good reason to think that PTSD
defenses are not always successful from a defendant's viewpoint. See infra note 291.
" See comments of Dr. Charles Figley quoted in Crimmins, supra note 12. Most of the cases
concerning PTSD as a defense to a violent crime with which Dr. Figley has been consulted, he
considers dubious. Id. This is "because the defendants 'are in a desperate situation. They need some
kind of excuse ....' Some of the defendants 'were misguided by their attorneys.' "Id. See also Schulz,
supra note 4, at 2402.
' 5 See supra notes 6 & 9: J. Wilson, infra note 27; Dondershine,iafra note 29; Milstein & Snyder,
supra note 6, at 86; Jack, supra note 6, at 7.
IS See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 20, 129-50, 304-12 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 313-20. PTSD also has implications in personal injury litigation. See Smith, Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder — An Often Overlooked Element of Trauma, TRIAL MAG., Feb. 1984, at 92. See
also Walker, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder After .4 Car Crash, 69 POST GR.AD. Men. 2:83 (1981). For cases
involving battered spouses, see infra note 244.
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I. POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER - An Overview
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the designation assigned to a group of
symptoms in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association (DSM 111). 19 Prior to 1980, when the most recent edition of the
manual was published, the symptoms that are now grouped under PTSD were not
included under a single diagnostic heacling. 2° Consequently, prior to 1980, mental health
professionals and attorneys lacked an identifiable and accepted description of the symp-
toms now known as PTSD that could be employed in diagnosis, treatment., or legal
proceedings. 2 ' In cases involving veterans, the lack of a recognized definition of these
'° AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM 111].
DSM III provides:
Diagnostic criteria for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of
distress in almost everyone
B. Reexperiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the following:
(I) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event
(2) recurrent dreams of' the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccurring, because of
an association with an environmental or ideational stimulus
C. Numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the external world,
beginning some time after the trauma, as shown by at least one of the following:
(1) markedly diminished interest in one or more significant activities
(2) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(3) constricted affect
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present before the trauma:
(1) hyperalertness or exaggerated startle response
(2) sleep disturbance
(3) guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior required for
survival
(4) memory impairment or trouble concentrating
(5) avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic event
(6) intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or resemble
the traumatic event
Id.
20 See infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text. The original edition of the DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATrwricAL MANUAL., which was published during the period of the Korean War, included a
diagnostic category for "Gross Stress Reaction" that referred to combat as a precipitating factor.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 40 (1st
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as DSM I]. "Gross Stress Reaction" was dropped in the 1968 edition of
the manual, and the symptoms were categorized under "Transient Situational Disturbances." AMER-
ICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as DSM II]. For a review of the development of the two previous editions, see
Spitzer, Introduction to DSM III, supra note 19, and Introduction ID STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM
VETERANS, supra note 3.
" See infra note 22. There are few reported cases, prior to 1980, that discuss the attempt to
connect military service with criminal conduct. As early as 1960, however, veterans were attempting
to describe the condition now known as PTSD. For example, in Meadows v. United States, 282 1 7.2d
942 (5th Cir. 1960), a veteran who had been discharged from the service as a "psychoneurosis
patient" explained that "the irresponsible acts held against him at his trial were acts beyond the
control of petitioner which happened when his war-scrambled brain failed to function as a normal
person." Id. at 942.
By the early 1970's, both psychiatrists and Vietnam veterans were searching for an explanation
of the veteran's criminal conduct which fit the diagnostic tools available at that time. In cases
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symptoms diminished the validity of the theory that reactions to combat could influence
behavior long after the war. 22 Thus, the very real problems experienced by Vietnam
veterans were often misdiagnosed, unrecognized and untreated for almost a decade after
the end of the Vietnam war. 23 Veterans who attempted to seek help were often misdiag-
nosed as psychotic, substance dependant or malingerers who suffered from a fictional
malady 2 4
PTSD, however, is far from being a fictional malady invented to get Vietnam veterans
"off the hook." 25 Although experts differ over the incidence of PTSD in the veteran
population, and over its application in particular cases, there is little dispute that it exists.
The Veteran's Administration (VA), for example, not only has adopted the diagnostic
involving veterans, psychiatrists and psychologists referred to such conditions as "a disassociative
state of mind ... [that] was a direct result of extreme pressure and stress experienced by the
defendant during combat in Vietnam." Harvey v. State, 225 Tenn. 316, 319-20, 468 S.W.2d 731, 732
(1971). In another case, apparent PTSD symptoms were diagnosed as "anxiety, poor interpersonal
relationships and passive and aggressive qualities . If he imbibes sufficiently of drugs, alcohol or a
combination of both, he could develop total amnesia," and the defendant was diagnosed as a
"cyclothymic personality, hypermanic type, and a hysterical neurosis, disassociative type." State v.
Seeley, 212 Kan. 195, 198-99, 50 P.2d 115, 118-19 (1973). The court determined defendant's
behavior was the result of voluntary intoxication, however, holding that his drinking was not an
involuntary response to his service in Vietnam and the related stress. Id. at 200-03, 510 P.2d at
120-21. As a result, the court in Seeley upheld the trial court's refusal of an insanity instruction. Id. at
200, 510 P.2d at 120.
The difficulty in linking PTSD symptoms to a description of the disorder that lay persons could
understand was highlighted in Kemp v. State, 61 Wis, 2d 125, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973). In a case
which, when viewed in retrospect, clearly implicated PTSD, six psychiatrists examined the defen-
dant. Id. at 135, 211 N.W. 2d at 797. A defense psychiatrist and two court-appointed psychiatrists
concluded that the defendant could not be held responsible for his conduct. Id. The three state
psychiatrists would not offer an opinion, although one of them indicated that the defendant might be
insane. Id. The jury, nonetheless, returned a verdict of guilty. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
however, reversed the defendant's conviction as a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 138, 211 N.W. 2d at
799. As late as 1975, a defendant who apparently suffered extreme PTSD reactions was convicted
without the presentation of any psychiatric or psychological testimony on behalf of the defendant.
State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 557, 213 S.E.2d 305, 313 (1975). The defendant's PTSD symptoms
were improperly diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. See id. at 559, 213 S.E. 2d 305, 315. It appears
that the defendant's attorney was simply unaware of PTSD.
By 1979, psychiatrists were beginning to refer to "traumatic neurosis" and "a disassociative
condition," but could not link a recognized psychological condition to the behavior at issue. Houston
v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 786-87 (Alaska 1979). Even as late as 1980, mental health experts were still
explaining PTSD symptoms as a "dissassociative hysterical neurosis, arising in part from the defen-
dant's military combat experience .. . ." See People v. Meatte, 98 Mich. App. 74, 76-77, 296 N.W.2d
190, 191 (1980).
22 See supra note 4, and infra text accompanying notes 66.102. Prior to the publication of DSM
III, veterans attempted without much success to explain the relationship between their service and
the criminal conduct with which they were charged. See Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264,
266-67 (8th Cir. 1971); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 786 (Alaska 1979); People v. Danielly, 33 Cal.
2d 362, 382-83, 202 P.2d 18, 30 (1949); People v. Walker, 33 Cal. 2d 250, 252-53, 201 P.2d 6 (1949);
People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306, 240 P. 1000, 1002 (1925); State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 510 P.2d 115
(1973); State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975); Harvey v. State, 225 Tenn. 316, 468
S.W.2d 731 (1971); Kemp v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 125, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973).
2'2 See supra note 22 and cases cited therein.
24 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. See also The Troubled Vietnam Vet, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 30, 1981, at 25.
22 Symptoms now known as PTSD can be seen in cases following both WW I and WW II. See
Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1971); People v. Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362,
382-83, 202 P.2d 18, 30 (1949); People v. Walker, 33 Cal. 2d 250, 252-53, 201 P.2d 67-68 (1949).
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criteria for PTSD set out. in DSM [11,26 but has also set up over 100 out-reach centers that
have provided counselling for thousands of veterans who experience PTSD symptoms.27
PTSD is also recognized by the VA as a basis for disability clainas. 26 In addition, both
in-patient and out-patient treatment programs have been established in VA hospitals to
provide treatment for veterans with symptoms of PTSD."
Any principled description of PSTD must begin with the clear recognition that it is
not a new phenomenon in combat veterans," nor is it limited to veterans. 3 ' A substantial
body of research suggests that stress reactions among veterans have resulted from every
major conflict in this century and, perhaps, are an unavoidable consequence of war. 32 In
addition, over the past several decades research has indicated that reactions similar to the
PTSD diagnostic criteria can be seen in such apparently diverse groups as rape victims,33
World War II (WW II) and Korean War veterans?' Holocaust survivors, Hiroshima
atomic blast victims" and survivors of other catastrophic events." Thus, any attempt to
present PTSD as a "Vietnam Veterans Problem" is clearly misplaced and tactically un-
wise.37
The fact that PTSD encompasses reactions to stressful events other than combat in
Vietnam is recognized in the diagnostic criteria for PTSD set forth by the American
Psychiatric Association in DSM III. In that discussion, DSM 1 I1 states that: "itlhe essential
feature is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically trauma-
tic event that is generally outside the range of normal human experience." 3d According to
DSM III, traumatic events that can precipitate PTSD symptoms include floods, ear-
thquakes, car or plane accidents, bombing, torture, and, of course, combat. 39
Following the traumatic event, a person who suffers from PTSD may have a number
of symptoms that include: self medication through substance or alcohol abuse," memory
loss, loss of sleep, nightmares reliving the original traumatic event, intrusive thoughts,
z' Rating Practices and Procedures, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEMORANDUM PG 21-1 § 0-12 at
1-3 (revised June 30, 1981). See also 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.125 & 4.132 (1983).
27 J. Wilson, Stress Response Syndrome Among Vietnam Veterans: The Need for Continued
Outreach Programs (testimony before U.S, Senate Subcommittee on government spending) (Oct. 19,
1981) (unpublished manuscript). See The Troubled Vietnam Vet, supra note 24, at 24.
" V.A. DIAGNOSTIC CODES, RATING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, DISABILITY MENTAL. DISOR-
DERS, PROGRAM GUIDE 21-1, § 0-12, June 30, 1981.
29 H. Dondershine, The Veteran and the Criminal Process: Three Subtypes of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder Associated with Criminal Behavior (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
Dept. of Psychiatry, Stanford University Medical School) (Dr. Dondershine is staff psychiatrist at the
Vietnam Veterans' Treatment Unit, V.A. Medical Center, Palo Alto, Cal.).
3° See generally Psychiatric Disorders in Crews Overseas and in Returnees, 29 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 729
(1945); DSM I, supra note 20, at 40; Kardiner, The Neurosis of War, 1 WAR MED. 219 (1941). See also
infra note 25.
3' DSM III, supra note 19, at 236.
52 For historical review of reports of psychiatric disorders arising from combat, see Note, supra
note 6, at 92-100. See also infra text accompanying notes 66- 102.
" State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653.54, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982). See also Burgess, Rape
Trauma Syndrome, I BEHAV. SCI. & LAW, No. 3 at 97 (1983).
31
 DSM 111, supra note 19, at 237; see also infra notes 85- 86.
33 Wilson & Ziglebaum, The Vietnam Veteran on Trial: The Relation of Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder
to Criminal Behavior, I BEHAV. Sm. & LAW, No. 3 at 69 (1983).
36
 Id. See also DSM III, supra note 19, at 236-37.
37 See infra notes 103-17.
3' DSM III,  supra note 19, at 236.
as Id.
Id. at 237.
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exaggerated startle response, reduction in emotional response, a feeling of alienation,
and, "disassociative states" during which the original event is relived and "the individual
behaves as though experiencing the event of the moment.'' To a lay observer, these symptoms
may not seem terribly surprising following a traumatic event of the magnitude described
in DSM 111. The more difficult. aspect of PTSD for many to accept is that the symptoms of
PTSD can occur long after the original traumatic event has ended. According to DSM I I I, those
individuals affected by PTSD may experience symptoms when environmental or emo-
tional situations approximate the original event.. 42 Thus, long after the traumatic event,
persons affected by PTSD may react as though they were back in the original traumatic
situ at ion. 43
This tendency to "reexperience" or "relive" the original event is common to those
who experience PTSD symptoms after a traumatic event, regardless of its source." For
those trained to survive in combat, a "reexperiencing" of the original event may include
combat-like reactions.45 Accordingly, DSM 111 specifically mentions "unpredictable explo-
sions of aggressive behavior" as characteristic of war veterans with I'TSD. 46
Recent studies have reported that "explosive behavior" may be only one variant of
the stress reactions experienced by veterans.'" Dr. John Wilson and Dr. Sheldon Zig-
lebaurn have suggested that at least three types of PTSD reactions can be seen in the
veterans they have interviewed and treated. First, a dissociative reaction in which the
veteran behaves as he did in combat . 48 Second, a compulsive "living on the edge" response
in which the veteran repeatedly seeks out dangerous or highly stimulating situations. 49
Third, a profound "survivor guilt" reaction which leads to intense despair, suicide
attempts or attempts to get caught, punished or killed. 5°
As one might expect, these reactions may lead to behavior that has a wide range of
legal implications for veterans. Sonic authorities have suggested, that twenty-five to thirty
percent of Vietnam veterans who saw heavy combat have been arrested on criminal
charges.5' In addition, high suicide rates5 2 substance abuse, marital difficulties, and
employment problems, all of which have legal implications, occur more frequently among
Vietnam veterans who saw heavy combat than among the general population . 53 To the
" Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). "Exaggerated startle response" is a psycho-physiological
change that is brought on by an unexpected sudden stimulus, such as a loud noise. It includes
tremor, sweating, dry mouth, and a feeling ()I' fear or panic, and is sometimes followed by escape or
avoidance reactions. WEBSTER'S 30 New INT'I. DICTIONARY 2228 (17 ed. 1976). A "disassociative
state" is one that lasts from a few minutes to several hours or even days, during which components of
the event are relived and the individual behaves as though experiencing the event at that moment.
DSM 111, supra note 19, at 236.
42 DSM III, supra note 19, at 237.
45 Id. at 236-37.
44 id
45 Id.
4's Id. at 237. "Explosive behavior" is a bursting, sudden increase in movement or response.
WEBSTER'S 3D New 1NT'L DICTIONARY, 802 (17 ed. 1976). See also DSM III, supra note 19, at 237.
" See J. Wilson, supra note 27; H. Dondershine, supra note 29.
" J. Wilson, supra note 27, at 8.
'9
 Id. at 9.
" Id. at I L
" Schulz, supra note 4, at 2401; H. Dondershine, supra note 29, at 4.
52 The suicide rate among Vietnam veterans is 23% higher than that of the same age group in
the general population. Egendorf, supra note I, at 38.
55 See generally Egendorf, supra note I. This study examined the adjustment patterns of veterans
and their nonveteran peers in nine areas of concern, which included educational careers and benefit
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extent that such behavior is causally related to PTSD in a given case, the most important
conclusion that attorneys can draw from these studies is that PTSD can affect virtually every
aspect of a veteranIclient's behavior.
It is crucial for attorneys to understand that the effects of PTSD while widespread,
may be subtle. Furthermore, if Wilson and Ziglebaum's suggestions are correct, the
effects of PTSD may not initially appear to be related to combat at al1. 54 PTSD symptoms,
for example, may mimic those of alcohol or substance abuse." Because symptoms are
episodic in nature, a veteran client may not exhibit abnormal behavior characteristics
when the client. and lawyer come in contact with each other and PTSD may be over-
looked." Often veterans who experience PTSD symptoms will deny a connection to
Vietnam or will be unable to remember significant events which might indicate a PTSD
connection. 57
 For attorneys who are not trained in psychology or psychiatry, this implies
an increased duty to examine a veteran client's psychological history for a PTSD connec-
tion with particular care, even when the relationship is not readily apparent. 58 Failure to
do so may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel," and is certainly a disservice to the
client.
Another important aspect of PTSD that attorneys should recognize is that PTSD is a
psychological condition brought about by fictors external to the person who experiences symptoms."
This is important because unlike many other psychological disorders, it is possible to point
to specific events to establish a causal link to client behavior." As a result, once PTSD is
utilization, occupational careers, mental health, capacities to deal with stress, drug and alcohol use,
arrests and convictions, marital status and satisfaction, peer integration and the nature of friendship
networks, and the working through of war experiences. Id. See also generally STRESS DISORDERS
AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS,supra note 3; Schulz,supra note 4; A Delayed Reaction: Vietnam Casualties at
Home, Ms. MAG., Sept. 1980, at 39.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 48 - 50.
55 In People v. Wood, discussed infra notes 151-85 and accompanying text, the defendant sought
treatment for alcoholism, only to find that the source of the alcohol abuse was an attempt to
sell-medicate the effects of PTSD. See also DSM 111, supra note 19, at 237; Walker, Vietnam Combat
Veterans with Legal Difficulties: A Psychiatric Problem, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1384, 1385 (1981).
5* For example, in at least two cases, State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo
Parish, La., Oct. 10, 1981) and People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., May 5,
1982), the attorneys representing the veteran defendants were unaware that PTSD could he a factor
in client behavior. In Heads, the connection was made only after an earlier conviction had been
reversed on appeal. In Wood, a one-line notation in a hospital record from a year before the offense
mentioned, "patient reports nightmares about Vietnam." That notation led the author to begin to
explore the client's military history. In both cases, had counsel not investigated the client's service
history and reactions after Vietnam, the connection would probably never have been made.
" This problem is not limited to the attorney-client setting. Some veterans have developed a
mistrust of authority figures generally. A "chip-on-the-shoulder" attitude often sets up an "adversa-
rial relationship even in a treatment context." Walker & Cavenar, supra note 2, at 175. The
description of PTSD in DSM III also makes clear that memory impairment is a characteristic of the
disorder. DSM III, supra note 19, at 236.
" See supra note 56.
se
	at least two PTSD cases where convictions have subsequently been overturned in appellate
or post-conviction proceedings, the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial was raised. People v.
Cohea, No. 1 Crim. 21566 (Sup. Ct. Contra Costa, Cal., Nov. 1983); Brief for Appellant, State v.
Dobbs, No. 105349 (16th Jud. Dist. Ct., St. Mary Parish, La., Mar. 1983). In both Dobbs and Cohen,
convictions of sentences in which PTSD had not been raised by the defense were reopened. Id. See
also infra text accompanying notes 385-87.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 19, 31-37.
61 For a discussion of the importance of making the specific connections between the Vietnam
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found to be a factor in client behavior, an attorney may present in a systematic and logical
manner the events that brought about the acts in question. 62 This means that PTSD may
require far less of the "leap of faith" based upon expert opinion than other psychological
disorders. Perhaps most importantly, and perhaps because PTSD is brought about by
external factors, many health professionals agree that PTSD is highly amenable to
treatment.63 Thus, it is possible to explain a client's behavior in a specific setting as a
reaction to certain conditions without also requiring the conclusion that the client is
beyond treatment or that the behavior will necessarily recur." In order to better under-
stand PTSD and its proper role, attorneys should be aware of the disorder's development
and recent recognition.
A. A Short History of the Scientc Understanding of PTSD
Western literature reflects a long standing awareness that the shock and trauma of
combat have left an indelible imprint upon the soldier. 65 As has been noted by others,
even The Aenid contains in a speech by Aeneas a reference to the inner conflict of the
returned warrior:
In me it is not fit, holy things to bear
Red as I am from slaughter and new from war
Till in some living stream I cleanse the guilt
Of dire debate and blood in battle spilt."
The advent of modern warfare and the science of psychiatry in the early decades of
the twentieth century gave rise to the first attempts to explain and categorize psychologi-
cal reactions to combat 8 7 During World War I (WW I), post combat reactions, then called
"shell shock," were thought to be the result of changes in air pressure that caused
physiological damage to the brain. By the end of WW I, it was recognized that aberrant
behavior was also manifested in soldiers who may not have sustained physiological
damage.68 "War neurosis," the new description as this phenomenon was then described,
experience and tha conditions that brought about the criminal behavior, see the discussion of Heads
and Wood infra at notes 129- 85. For a discussion of the strategy and tactics in PTSD litigation, see
text accompanying notes 241 - 312.
" See infra notes 270- 312 and accompanying text.
63 See J. Wilson, Towards An Understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among Viet-
nam Veterans (testimony before U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs, May 21, 1980,
Wash., D.C.). In its first year of operation, for example, the Veterans Outreach Program reached
some 80,000 veterans and provided successful treatment in 60% of the cases. J. Wilson, supra note 27,
at 1.
" The importance of this aspect of PTSD is apparent when treatment programs are suggested
in lieu of incarceration or other punishment. See infra notes 230-43.
65 See Note, supra note 6, at 92 (referring to literary treatment of post-war reaction).
66 Speech from THE Auxin, Memorandum accompanying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
filed in State v. Jensen, No. CR 75687, at 4-5 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Feb. 1983) thereinafter cited as
Memorandum in Petition, State v. Jensen]. The author is indebted to the attorney For Mr. Jensen,
Victor Aronow of Phoenix, Ariz., for his assistance in preparing this portion of the article.
67 The first attempt to classify psychological disorders was published by the American Psychiat-
ric Association (APA) in 1917. See generally FREEDMAN, KAPLAN & SA.DOCK, I Comprehensive Textbook on
Psychiatry, 824, 845 (1975). See also Goodwin, The Etiology of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorders (a monograph published by Disabled American Veterans, Cin. ; Ohio).
" See S. FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND WAR NEUROSES, INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBRARY,
VOL, 5 (1919); A.J. Glass, Introduction CO THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF STRESS (P. Bourne ed.
1969). See also C. Figley, Introduction ED STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS, Supra note 3.
314	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 25:305
was thought to develop in individuals whose backgrounds and personalities caused them
to be predisposed to neurotic reactions rather than being a predictable result of the
traumatic experience of combat itself. 69 It is clear that WW I veterans recognized that
combat had changed their lives and that the "shell shock" they experienced had an impact
upon behavior, including criminal conduct." Nevertheless, the scientific foundation of
psychiatry, much less shell shock, was not well understood at that time and courts
appeared to be reluctant to recognize the existence of a connection between combat and
aberrant post-war behavior. 7 '
During the same period, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) undertook to
create a uniform and standardized classification system as a reference for the diagnosis
and treatment of "war neurosis" and other disorders. By 1934, this classification system
was revised and incorporated into the American Medical Association's (AMA) Standard
Classified Nomenclature of Diseases . 72
During the early stages of World War II (WW II), the practice of focusing on an
individual's predisposition as the major factor in psychological reactions to combat began
to be questioned. The high rate of psychiatric casualties during the early part of the war
caused a reassessment of the impact of predispositional factors and a corresponding
increased focus on the impact of combat itself." The resulting description of "combat
fatigue" identified the stress of combat as the cause of the psychiatric trauma, and it was
thought that on-site treatment and removal from the combat arena would relieve the
condition."
Following WW II, there were indications that the popular media recognized dial
veterans who returned from war were experiencing psychological distortions related to
combat long after the war had ended." Although there may have been some recognition
that returned veterans experienced adjustment difficulties following the war, veterans
were largely unsuccessful in proving a causal relationship between their war experience
and subsequent conduct which resulted in criminal proceedings. 76
For example, in a 1949 case, People v. Danielly , 77 a defendant with a diagnosis of
69 Goodwin, supra note 67, at 6.
" See supra note 68. See also People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306, 240 P. 1000, 1002 (1925).
" See supra note 68. See also People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal, 306, 240 P. at 1002-03 (1925).
" See generally STANDARD CLASSIFIED NOMENCLATURE OF DISEASES, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSN
(AMA) (1939). See Memorandum in Petition, State v. Jensen, supra note 66, at 9.
73 See C. Figley, introduction to STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS,SUpTa note 3; R.R.
GR1NKER & J.P. SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS (1945). In the early years of WW II, psychiatric
casualties increased 300% over WW I. At one point the number of soldiers being discharged for
psychiatric reasons exceeded the total number of men being drafted. See Tiffany & Allerton, Army
Psychiatry, in the Mid-60's, 123 AMER, J. OF PSYCHIATRY 810-21 (1967).
14 P. BOURNE, MEN, STRESS AND VIETNAM (1970); Glass, Psychotherapy in the Combat Lone, 110
AMER. J. OE PSYCHIATRY 725 (1954).
75 Several films such as "The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit" and "The Pride of the Marines"
helped prepare the population for the returning veterans. In the 1946 film, "The Best Years of Our
Lives," a returning Air Force gunner finds he is unable to adapt to civilian life. He finds a wrecked
B-29 in a local scrapyard and appears to experience a disassociative "Hash back" while sitting in the
cockpit of the wrecked plane. Memorandum in Petition, State v. Jensen, supra note 66, at 9. See also
V.J. DeFazio, Dynamic Perspectives on the Nature and Effects of Combat Stress in STRESS DISORDERS AMONG
VIETNAM VETERANS, supra note 3, at 23.
76 See generally Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1971); People v. Danielly,
33 Cal. 2d 362, 382-83, 202 P.2d 18, 30 (1949); People v. Walker, 33 Cal. 2d 250, 252-53, 210 P.2d 6,
7-8 (1949).
77 People v. Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949).
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"combat fatigue" and a psychiatric discharge was precluded from even making an offer of
proof regarding the existence of a war-related psychological disorder. 78 In upholding the
denial of the offer of proof, the court relied on the testimony of a psychiatrist who stated
that the defendant's combat experience in the Mediterranean could not be related to later
psychological disorders because an explosion which severely wounded him "didn't involve
the brain."" Although it is now possible to recognize apparent symptoms of PTSD
outlined in the opinion, the defendant was unable to present any expert testimony to
support his temporary insanity claim."
During WW II, the AMA classification system proved inadequate as a diagnostic tool
because, at least in part, it lacked classifications for psychosomatic and personality disor-
ders, acute disturbances and other disorders that were observed by military doctors." In
response, Dr. William Menninger was commissioned by the Veteran's Administration to
develop a standard psychiatric nomenclature system for the military." In 1951, based in
part upon the VA classification system produced by Menninger, the APA published the
first comprehensive post-war classification system which was more suited to use by non-
military doctors. This Diagnostic and Statistical Manual I (DSM I) contained a diagnostic
category entitled "Gross Stress Reaction" which was characterized by exposure to strong
emotional and mental stress, such as combat. 83 Like the "combat fatigue" of WW II,
"Gross Stress Reaction"- was seen as a situational disorder that would abate with a
reduction in exposure to the stressor."
The experience of the Korean War appeared to confirm this conclusion because the
rate of psychiatric casualties were reduced from twenty-three percent of battlefield
evacuations in WW II to six percent in the Korean conflict." This apparent success in the
reduction of battlefield psychiatric casualties, and the focus on "Gross Stress Reaction" or
"combat fatigue" as purely situational may explain the lack of attention paid to the reports
of stress reactions experienced by WW I1 veterans many years after the end of the war as
evidenced in follow-up studies of WW 11 veterans."
In the mid-1960s, the United Nations' World Health Organization promulgated a
revised international nomenclature system that differed from DSM 1. 87 As a result of
these differences, the APA published a revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM II)
in 1968." With the WW II and Korean experiences far in the past, the "gross stress
reaction" of DSM I received little attention. Combat-related stress was categorized as
incidental to a broad category called "transient situational disturbances" that included a
wide range of symptoms with varying levels of severity."
79 Id. at 374, 202 P.2d at 28.
79 Id. at 372, 202 P.2d at 28.
H° Id.
91 A.M. FREEDMAN, H.I. KAPLAN & Bd. SADOCK, I COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK ON PSYCHIATRY,
II, 826-845 (1975); see generally Spitzer, Introduction to DSM III, supra note 19.
88 Id.
" Spitzer, Introduction to DSM III, supra note 19.
" Goodwin, supra note 67, at 7.
95 P. BOURNE, supra note 74, at 17.
" Follow-up studies after five years: Futterman & Pumpion-Mindlin, Traumatic War Neuroses
Five Years Later, 108 AMER. J. or Psvcaufizav, No. 6, 401-08 (1951); and after 20 years, H.E.
Archibald & R.D. Tuddenham, Persistent Stress Reaction After Combat: A Twenty Year Follow-up, 12
ARCHIVES Or GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 475-81 (1965) (both studies reported PTSD reactions in returning
WW II veterans). See also Goodwin, supra note 67, at 6.
87 Memorandum in Petition in State v. Jensen, supra note 66, at 9-10.
88 See Goodwin, supra note 67.
'9 See supra note 20.
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This was the state of the diagnostic materials available to mental health professionals
until 1980. Thus during the entire period of the Vietnam War, the major diagnostic
manual available to clinicians made no mention of the severe psychiatric disorders
observed during WW I, WW II, and the Korean War. Moreover, the available diagnostic
information provided no insight into the possibility that the onset of stress reactions might
he delayed long beyond the end of exposure to the source of the stress.
B. The Vietnam Experience
Initially, psychiatric reports From Vietnam seemed to confirm that military psychia-
trists had "solved" the ancient problem of psychiatric casualties. Battlefield psychological
breakdowns occurred at much lower rates in Vietnam than in Korea." The one-year tour
of duty, regular leaves from combat zones, and other techniques were originally thought
to have provided a solution to the "combat fatigue" that had proved so costly in WW 11, 9 '
As the fighting wore on, however, both those who experienced acute combat reac-
tions, and many who did not, began reporting- symptoms identical to those reported by
some WW 11 veterans. These symptoms included intense anxiety, battle dreams, depres-
sion and explosive, aggressive behavior.° Unlike WW 11 and Korea, the frequency of
these psychiatric casualties did not increase as the war intensified. Rather, it was not until
after veterans began returning home in large numbers and the war began winding clown
that the reports of psychological disorders began to appear."
Prior to 1972 most research into combat stress in Vietnam concentrated on "front
line" breakdowns. The first articles hinting at the existence of some sort of delayed
reaction to the stress of Vietnam combat were published in 1972 and 1973," Dr. Chiam
Shatan reported that veteran patients were experiencing "frustrated mourning," ''im-
pacted grief" and "psychological numbing."" He concluded that the DSM 11 failed to
provide a category for what appeared to be a specific set of symptoms that appeared
regularly in the Vietnam veteran population." Despite Dr. Shatan's work, it was not until
1975 that. The Journal of Social Sciences published a special volume that provided the first
statistical information on the symptoms he had observed.° It was in this volume that the
.disorders known as "Post-Vietnam Syndrome" were first analyzed and the term "delayed
stress response" was applied consistently."
Following the publication of The Journal of Social Sciences special volume, experts on
veteran's issues such as Dr. Shatan, Dr. Robert Lifson and others were named by the APA
90 P. BOURNE, SUpra note 79, at 18-19.
"' See C. Figley, Introduction to STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS, supra note 3, at
xvii; Goodwin, supra note 67, at 7-11.
92 See Shatan, The Grief of Soldiers —The Vietnam Combat Veterans' Self-Help Movement, 43 Am. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 640 (1973). See supra note 86 for references to WW II veteran reactions.
93
 President's Commission on Mental Health, Report of the Special Working Group: Mental Health
Problems of Vietnam Era Veterans, Feb. 15, 1978, cited in Goodwin, supra note 67, at 6-7. For a discussion
of differences between military service in Vietnam and other combat experiences, see O. Figley,
Introduction to STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS, supra note 3, at xvii.
94 See C.F. Shatan, The Grief of Soldiers, 2 AMERICAN REPORTS 1-3 (1972) and Shatan, supra note
92, at 640-53; Shatan, Post Vietnam Syndrome, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1972, p. 35.
" See generally Shatan, supra note 92, at 640-53; Shatan, Through the Membrane of Reality Impacted
Grief and Perceptual Dissonance in Vietnam Combat Veterans, 11 Psycl IATRIC OPINION No. 6 at 10 (1974).
" Id.
" See generally Soldiers In and After Vietnam (Mantel) & Pilisuk eds.), 313. or Soc. Scm. 25, 25-37
(1975).
OH id.
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to study and revise the DSM 11 treatment of reactive disorders." At about the same time,
under the sponsorship of the Disabled American Veterans, Dr. John Wilson of Cleveland
State University published the first in depth study of the adjustment problems of Vietnam
veterans.'" Publication of The Forgotten Warrior Project along with other reports published
at about the same time, made it clear that stress reactions were far more common among
Vietnam veterans than had previously been recognized.m Between 1978 and 1980, the
revised draft of DSM 111 circulated among committees of the APA and on March 20, 1980
the final form of DSM III was adopted.'" Finally, almost two decades after the Vietnam
War began, psychiatrists and psychologists had a diagnostic category that described the
symptoms now known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
Once PTSD was recognized as a disorder that could be isolated and diagnosed by
psychiatrists and psychologists, it became a legitimate issue to be raised in legal proceed-
ings. After the publication of DSM Ill, therefore, PTSD was raised in several cases as an
explanation for a defendant's criminal conduct. The next section of this article examines a
few of" these cases, focusing in particular on the use of PTSD.
PTS1) IN LITIGATION
Because PTSD is a relatively new way of describing and explaining client behavior in
litigation, and because none of the cases in which it has been used successfully by the
defense at trial have reached the appellate level, the "case law" on PTSD is necessarily
limited to cases in which defendants were unable to present the defense in a convincing
manner. 10" The cases, however, make it clear that PTSD is recognized as a proper subject
00 Spitzer, Introduction to DSM Ill, supra note 19.
" J. WILSON, THE. FORGOITEN WARRIOR PROJECT (CICV. St. Unix, 1978).
101 See generally President's Commission on Mental Health, Report of Special Working Group: Mental
Health Problems of Vietnam Veterans, Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 1978; The Adjustment of Vietnam Era
Veterans to Civilian Life (report commissioned by the Veterans Administration, compiled by the
Center for Policy Research, N.Y., 1979).
DSM III, supra note 19, at 236.
103 Some cases in which PTSD has been raised at trial include: United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Valdez, Cr. No. 81-0030-E (U.S.DF., S.D. Cat. 1982); United
States v. Oldham, 1P-82-28-0 Cr. (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1981); United States v. Krutschewski, 541 F. Stipp.
142 (D. Mass. 1981), cited in Vietnam Stress Defense a Winner, Nat. L. J., Oct. 6, 1980; United States v.
Tindall, Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980); State v. Lowe, No. 81.00896 (Cir. Ct. Jefferson
County, Ala. Oct. 26, 1981); People v. Pettibone. No. 9632 (Sonoma County Super. Ct., Cal. Feb. 29,
1980),c/fed/it Nat. L. J., May 12, 1980, at 26, col. 1; State v. Lisnow, 80 Cal. App. 3d 21, 151 Cal. Rptr.
621 (1978); State v. Marshall, No. 83-214-CF-A-01 (Cir. Ct., 12th Jud. Cir., Sarasota County, Fla.
Dec. 1983); People v. Donnelly, No. 83 CF 113 (Cir. Ct. 16th Jud. Cir., Kane County, III. 1983);
People v. Wood. No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. May 5, 1982); Commonwealth v. Nicholls,
No.•79C0962 (Louisville Dist. Ct., Ky. July 21, 1980); State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct.
Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981); State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1983) discussed in Magee, The
Long War of Wayne Fettle, Slow Coming Dark: Interviews on Death Row 103 NATION, Jan. 2-9, 1982, at 11;
State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montg. County, Md. 1979); State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297,
669 P.2d 1092 (1983): State v. Gossell, No. 81L14749 (Licking County C.P., Ohio Feb. 5, 1981); State
v. Leach, Cr. No. 27672 (Cleveland Ct. C.P., Ohio April 4, 1977), aff'd., Cr. No. 37686 (Cleveland Ct.
App., Ohio Dec. 7, 1978); State v. Part!, No. 25975 (Deschutes County Cir. Ct., Or. March 18, 1980)
(discussed in transcript of NBC MAG., Dec. 5, 1980); Commonwealth v. Mulcahy, Cr. No. 460- 464
(Phila. Ct. C.P., Crim. Trial Div., Pa. Dec., 1978); State v. Smith, Tr. Ct. F-82-80575-JK (Cr. Dist. Ct.
'4, Dallas County, Tex. Aug. 16, 1982): State v. Mann, Cr. 80-F-75 (Kanawha County, Charleston, W.
Va. April 2, 1981); Slate v. Mann, cited in Milstein, War Is Hell. It's Also A Good Defense, AM. LAW., Oct.
1983, at 100; State v. Lukowski, No. 84 Cr. 245 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. Div. 3, Colo. Aug. 20,
318	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:305
for expert testimony in at least twenty-one states and five federal districts.'" In addition, a
number of majority and dissenting opinions have taken trial judges and attorneys to task
for failing to take PTSD seriously in both sentencing and at trial.'°5 In one appellate case
in which PTSD was implicated, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected an appellate
argument based upon PTSD because counsel had failed to properly raise the issue at
trial.'" This disposition, however, should not be read as a rejection of PTSD. Rather, it is
an indication that, like other factors influencing client behavior, PTSD must be properly
presented at trial.'" It re-emphasizes the premise of this article, that attorneys must
properly present PTSD, in order to adequately represent those veteran clients exhibiting
symptoms of PTSD.'"
As more attorneys begin to understand and apply PTSD to explain behavior, the
number of reported cases in which PTSD is a factor is likely to increase. At this point,
however, the discussion of the successful applications of PTSD must focus primarily on
cases at the trial level which are largely unreported.' 09
Probably the most dramatic and well publicized application of PTSD in the cour-
troom is in the defense of criminal charges."° Defenses based on PTSD have been
advanced in cases ranging from violent offenses, such as murder"' and attempted
murder," to nonviolent crimes such as drug conspiracies" and tax fraud." 4 As men-
tioned earlier, it would be incorrect for attorneys to conclude that these more notorious
cases represent the only application of PTSD to legal issues. PTSD may be a factor in
1982); People v. Kahan, cited in Milstein & Snyder, supra note 6, at 88; State v. Cocuzza, reported in Nat.
L.J., June 29, 1981.
'" PTSD has been mentioned in a number of reported opinions: see, e.g., United States v.
Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1069-77 (5th Cir. 1983); Scarborough v. United States, 683 F.2d 1323, 1324
(11th Cir. 1982); State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 603, 661 P.2d 767, 769 (Idaho App. 1983); Stader v.
State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (Ind. 1983); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653-54, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299
(1982); State v. Serrato, 424 So. 2d 214, 222-24 (La. 1983); State v. Felde, 422 So.2d 370, 377 (La.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1093 (1983); State v. Sharp, 418 So. 2d 1344, 1345-46 (1.a. 1982); State v.
Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092, 1097 (1983); Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (S.D.
1983): State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. 1983); Nash v. State, 651 S.W.2d 432, 432 (Tex.
App. 1983); Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656, 659-60 (Wyo. 1983).
See, e.g., State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn. 1983) (reversal of denial of probation);
Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 679 (S.D. 1983) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (failure to raise PTSD
denial of competent counsel); Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Wyo. 1983) (Rose, J.,
dissenting).
1 °6 State v. Hardi mon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Minn. 1981). But see People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App.
Supp. 3d 121, 123-27. 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 622-24 (1978) (supporting the use of PTSD on the issue of
intent).
1" See United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Krutschewski,
541 F.Supp. 142 (D. Mass. 1981); State v. Lisnow, 80 Cal. App. 3d 21, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1978). State
v. Hardiman, 310 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. 1981).
108
 See infra notes 271-312 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-85 and accompanying text.
110
 Pleading PTSD, TIME, May 26, 1980, at 59; War Echoes in the Courts, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23,
1981, at 103; Magee, supra note 103; The Bombshell Defense, supra note 6; Vietnam Veterans Advisor,
PENTHOUSE, Aug. 1982, at 100.
"' State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981). See infra
notes 129-50.
112 People v. Wood, supra note 103. See infra notes 151-85 and accompanying text.
"3 United States v. Tindall, Cr. No. 79
-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980). See infra notes 196
-210 and
accompanying text.
'" United States v. Oldham, IP 81-28-CR (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1981). See Nat. L. J., Dec. 28, 1981, at
3, cols, 3-4.
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virtually any legal issue involving the conduct of a client. Because many of the same issues
arise in the preparation and presentation of PTSD in criminal cases and other settings,
this article will focus on the use of PTSD in criminal cases to illustrate some of the
applications of PTSD to legal issues in which client conduct or state of mind plays a role. 15
Although all PTSD cases have a great deal in common, this article will examine cases
involving violent and nonviolent behavior separately. 16 This division is based not only
upon some differences in legal strategy but also upon a recognition that some disagree-
ment exists among mental health professionals regarding the application of a PTSD
diagnosis to crimes not obviously linked to the violent aspects of combat."'
A. PTSD and Explosive Criminal Behavior
The range of violent offenses to which PTSD has been advanced as a defense range
from murder" 8 to assault" 9 and weapons offenses.'" Although there is no "typical" set of
facts in PTSD cases, there are several factors which appear with some regularity. Very
often the criminal behavior apparently occurred spontaneously.' 2 ' Incidents which might
otherwise appear to be relatively benign, such as an argument with a supervisor,' 22 a
co-worker, 123 or a domestic dispute between husband and wife 124
 may suddenly erupt into
violence. In several cases, the defendants have had a history of substance or alcohol abuse
that began after the service.' 25
 Many defendants have not been able to explain why the
incident occurred or remember details of how it occurred.'" Frequently, the defendants
have had no previous criminal history.' 27 Often the defendant will be unaware of any
connection between Vietnam service and the offense or other current problems.'"
Examples of PTSD as a factor in explaining violent criminal conduct may he found in
two cases in which a jury found veterans not guilty by reason of insanity: Slate v. Heads' 29
and People v. Wood.' 3° These cases are of particular interest, not only because successful
15 See infra notes 271-312.
" 6 Id.
'" Even generally sympathetic menial health professionals disagree that nonviolent conduct can
be explained as a PTSD reaction. Schulz, supra note 4, at 2402.
"' State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (1st jud." Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981); State v.
Felde, No. 196240 (9th Jud. Dist. Ct. Parish of Rapides, La. Feb. 13, 1981).
" 9 People v. Pettibone, No. 9632-C (Sonoma County Super. Ct., Cal. Feb. 29, 1980).
' 2" See infra note 211.
"' Jack, supra note 6, at 7. See infra discussion of People v. Wood, notes 151-85 and accompanying
text.
'" People v. Wood, supra note 103. See supra text accompanying notes 151-185.
1" See Magee, supra note 103, at 11.
124 4, -re ple v. Pettibone.supra note 119. See discussion of PeMbone in Nat. L. J., May 12. 1980, at
26, col. 2.
'" See infra notes 137-62.
'29
	 supra note 6, at 18.
127 United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Krutschewski, 509
F. Stipp. 1186, 1188 (D. Mass. 1981); United States v. Oldham, 11' 81-28-CR (S.D. Intl. Dec. 1981);
United States v. Tindall, Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980); People v. Pettibone, No. 9632-C
(Super. Ct. Sonoma County, Cal. Feb. 29, 1980); People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County,
Ill., May 5, 1982); State v. Heads, No. 106, 126 (1st jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981). See
notes 174-80.
1" See the discussion of Wood and Heads, supra notes 129-85 and accompanying text.
129 No. 106, 126 (1st jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish, La. Oct. 10, 1981) The discussion of the Heads
case is drawn from an article written by one of Heads' defense lawyers. See Jack, supra note 6, at 7-19.
There is no other written record of the case.
m° No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct, Cook County, Ill. May 5, 1982). See infra discussion at notes 151-83.
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insanity defenses are rarely, if ever, argued to a jury,' 3 ' but also because they each took
very different tactical approaches to presenting PTSD at trial. 132
The defendant in State v. Heads was charged with murder in the shooting death of his
sister-in-law's husband.'" Mr. Heads broke into his sister-in-law's house in search of his
estranged wife and began firing a pistol. After the pistol was emptied of bullets, Mr.
Heads got a rifle from the trunk of his car and kept firing. One shot struck his sister-in-
law's husband.' 34
 Mr. Heads was tried in 1978, found guilty of murder, and sentenced to
life in prison.'" In 1980, through a series of appeals not related to PTSD, Charles Heads
was granted a new trial.'" It was in preparing for the second trial that the PTSD
connection was first made,
Between We first trial in 1978 and the retrial in October 1981, the APA recognized
PTSD as a diagnostic category.'" According to Mr. Heads' counsel, no one connected
with the case had heard of PTSD until after the publication of DSM III. 13S This new
information provided substance for the psychological aspects of the case which had
previously defied explanation.' 39
The effect of the new knowledge provided by the diagnostic criteria in DSM III aided
the presentation of the Heads case in two significant ways. First, DSM 111's description of
yrsD helped explain Mr. Heads' previously unexplained behavior. Second, because
PTSD is caused by a traumatic event in the defendant's past and because comparisons in a
defendant's life before and after the traumatic event. help identify the effects of the
traumatic event, 140
 PTSD provided a theory of admissibility for virtually the entirety of
Charles Heads' These factors were essential to enable the jury to understand the
psychologically devestating effects of combat.'" In addition, DSM 111's requirement that
the original traumatic event "evoke[s] significant symptoms of distress in most people,"'"
provided a basis for admitting testimony of those who had shared the Vietnam experi-
The author, together with a defense team composed of Prof. David Thomas, Chicago-Kent College
of Law, John Guzzardo, Chicago-Kent '83 and Tami Redding, Chicago- Kent '83, represented Mr.
Jean Wood in People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. May 5, 1982). Thanks to the
work of the defense team and the support of the workers from Ford Motor Company, Torrance Ave.
plant, the assistance of the Jearl Wood Defense Comrnittee, and the contributions of hundreds of
supporters that made preparing the case possible. Mr. Wood was found not guilty by a jury. '[he
discussion of the Wood case is drawn from the trial notes of the author. Because Mr. Wood was
acquitted, there is no written court Opinion of the case.
131
 The Wood case, for example, was believed to be only the second "not guilty by reason of
insanity-
 verdict returned by a jury in Cook County, III. (Chicago) in the last decade. Three Cases Fuel
Debate Over Insanity Defense, Chi-'I - rib., June 7, 1982. See also Slate v, Mann, cited in ;Milstein, War Is
Hell. It's Also A Good Defense, AM, LAW., Oct. 1983, at 100 (jury found defendant not guilty after
deliberating for less than ten minutes).
'" See infra discussion at notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
'3' Jack, supra note 6, at 7.
hi
13' 14. at 8.
130 id .
137 DSM III, supra note 19. See .copra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
13" jack, supra note 6, at 8.
'" Id. "The insanity defense at the first trial never got off the ground because neither of' I he
psychiatrists who had examined the defendant had found evidence of any recognized disorder." Id.
1 " See supra text accompanying notes 271-312.
'4' jack, supra note 6, at 9.
'" Id. at 8.
143 14. at 9.
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ence. 144
 The language in DSM III , therefore, provided the theory of legal relevance for
admitting into evidence testimony of Mr. Heads' childhood, his work history, his Vietnam
experiences, his difficulties with adjustment on return and the fact that he had no serious
criminal record," 5
 as well as the testimony of others regarding their Vietnam experiences
and reactions.'"
Evidence was amassed to attribute Mr. Heads' behavior to PTSD. The structure of
the presentation of this evidence at trial consisted of four components. First, testimony
from three experts in the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD who had examined Mr. Heads
was presented. Second, testimony to corroborate the existence of the facts in Mr. Heads'
life upon which the diagnosis was based was offered. Third, the defense offered tes-
timony regarding conditions leading up to the shooting incident and details of the scene
of shooting. Fourth, the court heard the testimony of Mr. Heads."' The testimony at trial
tended to establish that Charles Heads had been a nineteen-year-old combat soldier who
had no significant criminal history before or after Vietnam. After returning from Viet-
nam, he had experienced at least one "dissociative state" in which he reverted to combat-
type behavior; the Vietnam-like physical conditions at the scene of the shooting which,
together with the emotional threat of losing his wife and family, combined to cause a
reaction in which Mr. Heads "was on automatic"; and that after the shooting Mr. Heads
was quietly arrested at the scene, still holding his weapon. 148
Under Louisiana law, a defendant is "exempt from criminal responsibility" if the
offender was incapable of distinguishing "right and wrong."'" After two weeks of trial,
the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, apparently after concluding
that Mr. Heads could not distinguish right and wrong during the shooting episode,iso
In People v. Wood,' 51
 a 1982 case in Chicago, Illinois, the defendant was charged with
attempted murder in the shooting of his foreman after a dispute at work.' 52
 _lead Wood
was accused of drinking on the job by his foreman and was given a breathalyzer test by a
nurse that apparently confirmed the foreman's charge. As a result, he was sent out of the
plant. Mr. Wood then went to his car in the parking lot, returned to the plant and, in front
of several dozen witnesses, fired twice, severely wounding the foreman. Within hours he
turned himself into the police and confessed."3
Like the defendant in the Heads case, Mr. Wood was a veteran who had no criminal
record. He was married, had a family and possessed a good work record. Also like Mr.
Heads, he was completely unaware that he was affected by in-sr:034
144 Id .
145 Id .
146 Id .
147 Id .
"6 Id. at 18.
149 Id. at 17. The insanity issue in Louisiana is governed by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14 (West
1977). It provides that "if the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental
detect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the
conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility." Id.
"° Jack, supra note 6, at 7. As of 1980, Charles Heads was in jail waiting to be sent to an
appropriate mental institution, as required by Louisiana law.Id. at 19. The V.A. has refused to accept
responsibility +Or him. Id.
'' No. 80-7410 {Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. May, 1982).
152 Id.
1 " Id. See generally Crimmins, .supra note 12; Worker Who Shot Foreman Claims Racial Harassment,
Chi. Defender, Oct. 18, 1980, p. 3.
1" Counsel for Mr. Wood did not learn of the effects of PTSD on Mr. Wood until several
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As one might expect, many parallels exist between the Heads and Wood cases. Both
were tried before a jury, both advanced PTSD to help explain their behavior, and both
resulted in findings of not guilty by reason of insanity. The principal distinctions are that
Mr. Wood did not testify at trial and he was released for treatmentas an outpatient rather
than being institutionalized. 155
As in the Heads case, PTSD in the Wood case provided the theory of legal relevance
which allowed the introduction of most of the significant events in Mr. Wood's life. 156 The
structure of the presentation of the evidence however, differed markedly from that in the
Heads case. In the Wood case, the diagnosis of PTSD was not presented until the last
witness testified. Thus, the entire case was put into evidence before the diagnosis conclu-
sively established the relevance of the preceding testimony,'"
The structure of the presentation of evidence in People v. Wood was as follows:
(a) Dr. Charles Figley, art expert in PTSD who had never met Jearl Wood testified
about the symptoms of PTSD to establish that such a condition existed,'"
(la) Family, friends and acquaintances testified to significant events in Mr. Wood's life
that occurred before and after Vietnam under the theory that these facts corroborated
the basis for the opinion which was to follow;' 59
(c) Mr. Wood's service records and those of his unit were read into evidence under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule in order to verify his combat service
and to illustrate the conditions in Vietnam;"°
(d) Veterans who served with Mr. Wood, and some who did riot, testified about
conditions in Vietnam under the theory that this testimony corroborated the existence of
traumatic events experienced by Mr. Wood in Vietnam;"'
(e) Dr. Bennett Braun, a former army captain and a psychiatrist, who had treated
the defendant, testified that he had toured the plant and that the sights and sounds of the
plant were much like combat. Tape recordings of loud plant sounds and photographs of
„physical conditions were made by tire psychiatrist to illustrate his testimony."'
(f) Co-workers testified that Mr. Wood had not appeared to have been drinking but
rather that he appeared to begin "acting strangely" when confronted by the foreman.' 63
(g) Dr. John Wilson, the psychologist who made the original PTSD diagnosis of Jearl
months after entering the case. Mr, Wood did not talk about his Vietnam experience until he began
therapy fir the previously undiagnosed PTSD. People v. Wood, supra note 103.
155
 Order Wood Treatment on Outpatient Basis, Chi. Heights Star, July 15, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
'w See infra text accompanying notes 271
- 312.
1 " See generally People v. Wood, supra note 103.
iss
155 Id .
1" Id.
161 Id .
Id. Dr. Braun spent some 14 hours with Mr. Wood in sessions that employed hypnosis as a
therapy and as an aid to memory. In those sessions, Mr. Wood recalled many events from Vietnam
which he had repressed. The effect of the therapy was beneficial as a method to help Mr. Wood
"release" many of the memories he had never shared. In addition, the sessions aided Mr. Wood's
recollections of the men with whom he has served and provided counsel with the clues that were used
to locate members of his unit whom he had not seen in over ten years. The testimony of one of the
members of his unit was particularly crucial to explaining the Vietnam experience because Mr. Wood
did not testify at trial (reported by author who was co-counsel in People v. Wood). For a discussion of
the use of hypnosis as a form of PTSD therapy, see Brende & Benedict, The Combat Delayed Stress
Response Syndrome: Hypno Therapy of "Dissociative Symptoms," 23 AM. J. OF Cu N. HYPNOSIS, July 1980, at
34.
"3
 People v. Wood, supra note 103.
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Wood which was later confirmed by others,'" was the last winless. He testified that Mr.
Wood's attempts to get psychiatric treatment in 1979, his bouts with alcohol, his strange
behavior at the plant the night of the shooting, and the shooting incident itself all grew
out of his reactions to Vietnam.' 65 In Mr. Wood's case, the precipitating incidents that
caused the l'TSD reaction were the death of a brother, also a Vietnam veteran, with whom
he was very close and the threat of the loss of his job.'"
The testimony at. trial tended to establish that Mr. Wood entered a "survivor mode"
of behavior before and during the shooting. His actions during the shooting were closely
analogous to the survival reactions he had learned as a Marine. For a brief time Mr. Wood
was once again the frightened eighteen-year-old Marine who carried his ,45 caliber
automatic pistol everywhere and who survived his traumatic Vietnam experiences by
learning to react without thinking. 167
Because Illinois had adopted the Model Penal Code test for insanity, the jury was
asked to decide whether Mr. Wood could "substantially appreciate the criminality of his
acts" or "conform his conduct to the law."'" The general verdict of the jury of "not guilty
Ify reason of insanity- did not make clear whether the verdict. was based on one or both
prongs of the test.'"
Although Mr. Wood did not testify in his own behalf, the jury apparently saw a
connection between the life incidents described by others, the diagnosis and the shoot-
ing.'" In a separate commitment hearing after the trial, a psychiatrist for the Illinois
Department of Mental Health confirmed the PTSD diagnosis."' He also explained that
the unique episode that precipitated the PTSD reaction which led to the shooting did not
indicate that Mr. Wood was dangerous at the time of the hearing, nor that he would be
dangerous in the future. 1 T2 As a result, Mr. Wood was released to receive court-supervised
outpatient care.' 73
Both Slate v. Heads and People v. Wood illustrate a slightly different strategy dictated
by the circumstances of each case. For example, in Wood, the defendant's emotional
difficulty with his memories of Vietnam and his memory lapses made te'stimony both
painful For the defendant and unreliable. 174 There are, however, several common factors
in the two cases.
First, neither the defendants nor their attorneys were initially aware that PTSD
existed, or that it might. provide a theory of defense. 175 Second, both defendants had
experienced symptoms of PTSD Icing before the DSM f I I made diagnosis of the disorder
164 Id. See also Order Wood Treatment on Outpatient Basis, supra note 155.
as People v. Wood, supra note 103.
166 id ,
167 Id .
4 " See I IA.. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, § 6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982).
1" People v. Wood, supra note 103.
170 id.
in id .
as Id.
173 See supra note 155.
'" During pretrial motions in People v. Wood, the defendant admitted that he could not recall
many incidents on the night of the shooting. A psychiatrist, who is an expert in hypnosis, was
employed to assist the defendant to recall his Vietnam experience (reported by author, who was
co-counsel of record in People v. Wood).
'" See supra notes 117-68. Just before the case was to go to trial, counsel in the Wood case
discovered one line in a medical report, from an earlier hospitalization, that mentioned nightmares
alxna Vietnam. This was the first indication of a psychological condition related to Vietnam.
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possible. 176
 In the case of Mr. Wood he had actually sought treatment of alcoholism and
psychological problems in 1979 and had not been properly diagnosed.'" Third, both
defendants were teenage combat veterans, who apart from the violent acts which lead to
the pending charges, had little or no criminal history.' 78 Fourth, the trials were presented
almost as one would prove up a personal injury claim in which great care was taken to
precisely describe the original traumatic event and to explain its relation to the emotional
or environmental conditions at the time of the crime.' 79 Fifth and finally, p-rsD provided
the theory of legal relevance that allowed a full disclosure of defendant's life before,
during and after Vietnam.'"
As criminal defense practitioners will recognize, this approach to the presentation of
a psychological defense contravenes the accepted wisdom in many insanity cases. Insanity
cases arc often tried before a judge and the goal of the attorney is usually to demonstrate
that the events were so bizarre that insanity is required as a legal conclusion.'"' The
decision regarding the legal responsibility of the defendant in insanity cases is often
totally dependent upon conflicting opinions advanced by mental health professionals,
often with little opportunity for laymen to test the validity of those opinions." With
PTSD, however, the source of the mental disorder can be described in great detail." It is
also possible to show overt symptoms and behavior which allow the judge or jury to test
the validity of the diagnosis.' 81
 Thus, if the facts do not logically support the diagnosis or
the conclusion that the behavior at issue was logically consistent with the defendant's
behavior in Vietnam, a PTSD defense is unlikely to he successful before either a judge Or
a ju ry . 165
B. PTSD and Nonviolent or Compulsive Behavior
&Ali the Heads and Wood cases were based upon the "explosive behavior"-"survivor
mode" type of response described in DSM III and more fully described by numerous
researchers.'" A more controversial application of PTSD has been the use of PTSD to
1" DSM 111 was not published until 1980, which was after the defendants in Hearls and Wood had
manifested PTSD symptoms. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
'" See Jack, supra note 6, at 12.
179 Id .
179 Id .
190 Id.
in For a comparison of Wood and other insanity cases, see Three Cases Fuel Debate Over Insanity
Defense, supra note 131.
"2
 An example of a case of this sort is United States v. Hinckley, Nos. 81-2350, 81-2838 (D.C.
Cir. June 21, 1982). For a discussion of the insanity defense which reflects the skepticism about
psychiatric defenses underlying much of the criticism of expert testimony, see D. NISSMAN, B.
BARNES, C. AI.PERT, BEATING THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1-9 (1980). For a contrary assessment of the
insanity defense see MacCarthy, The Insanity Defense: What It Is and What Should It Be?, 7 CHAMPION,
Sept. -Oct. 1983, at 13.
' 83 See infra text accompanying notes 271-312.
l94
u‘s See, e.g., United States v. Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Mass. 1982); United States v.
Oldham, 1P-82-28-0 Cr. (S. D. Ind. Dec. 1981); State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092
(1983). See also supra note 104, and infra text accompanying notes 304-12.
' 88 See DSM III, supra note 19, at 236, 237; Walker, Vietnam Combat Veterans with Legal Difficulties:
A Psychiatric Problem?, 138 AM. J, PSYCHIATRY, Oct. 1981, at 1384; Apostle, The Unconscious Defense as
Applied to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in a Vietnam Veteran, 8 BULL. AA PL, at 426; Schulz, supra note
4, at 2401. See also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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explain nonviolent criminal conduct.'" At first blush, the suggestion that PTSD can
legitimately explain conduct such as burglary, robbery, drug dealing or tax evasion seems
hardly plausible. In light of the recent work of Wilson and Ziglebatun, however, this
explanation may not be as remote or implausible as it appears.'"
If, as suggested by these researchers, PTSD results in (a) reactions that include
danger and sensation-seeking, or (b) a guilt/punishment/suicide reaction in addition to
explosive behavior, the link to nonviolent behavior may not be so remote. For example, a
veteran who is compelled to seek danger and heightened sensation may engage in
activities that are both risky and have criminal consequences. 189
 Wilson and Ziglebaum
suggest that this sensation seeking may compel veterans to repeatedly engage in quasi-
military, sensation-fraught criminal conduct.'" A self-destructive, survivor guilt response,
for example, may explain the apparent tendency of some veterans to undertake criminal
activity that has little chance of success."' This reaction, it is suggested, is manifested by
veterans suffering from PTSD attempting to get killed, or to get "caught," and thus obtain
help for their symptoms, or punishment. for surviving. This may explain examples of
unarmed veterans attacking armed police' 92
 or committing a crime with no hope of
escape.'" Two examples of the use of PTSD to explain nonviolent criminal behavior can
be found in United States v. Tindall"' and State v. Gregory.'
Tindall was one of the first cases litigated after the publication of DSM III, and in
which PTSD was successfully advanced as an explanation for nonviolent criminal con-
duct.'" Tindall involved a large scale drug smuggling operation that was carried out by
fifteen people, including a number of veterans who had served together in Vietnam."'
Several co-defendants were tried and convicted on similar charges in another proceeding
in which p-rsD was also advanced as a defense.'"
The smuggling operation involved importing a large amount of marijuana or hashish
by sea.' 99 The veteran members of the plot had all been crew members on a COBRA
helicopter gun ship in Vietnam and none had serious criminal records.m) The compli-
"7
 See Schulz, supra note 4, at 2402.
' 00
 See generally Wilson	 Ziglebaum, supra note 35, at 74.
1 " Id. at 10.
1" Id.
"' Id. at 12.
'92 See report in Nat. L.J., Oct 6, 1980, at 4. The defendant attacked armed police officers with
a log for no apparent reason. The defendant was acquitted. Nat. L.J., June 29, 1981, at 4. See also
Ford, supra note 6, at 439.
'" Testimony in State v. Lowe, No. 81 - 00896,987 (Cir. Ct. _Jefferson County, Ala. Oct. 26, 1981)
indicated that the defendant was attempting to commit suicide in two robberies, cited in Milstein &
Snyder, supra note 6, at 86: State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28,
1981). See infra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
1°' Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980).
'" No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. 1979).
' N
 See The "Bombshell" Defense, supra note 6, at 26; Vietnam Stress Defense a Winner in Drug Case,
supra note 9, at 4, col. 1.
'°7
	 Stress Defense A Winner in Drug Case, supra note 9, at 4, col. 4.
1" It has been suggested that the PTSD defense in the related case, United States v.
Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Mass. 1981), was not successful because the defendant was the
moving party in the conspiracy and had financed the operation and recruited Tindall into the
operation. See Note, supra note 6, at 113.
1 " See Vietnam Stress Defense a Winner in Drug Case, supra note 9, at 4, cob. 2-3.
200
 Id. at col. 4.
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cated scheme was replete with intrigue, dangerous sea voyages across the Atlantic, and
quasi-military organization,"" Apparently, those involved continued to live out the rela-
tionships that had been established in Vietnam.2a2
The defendant in Tindall was a highly decorated Army helicopter pilot who flew
sonic 755 combat missions in Vietnam during 19702 03
 Mr. Tindall's participation in the
drug importation scheme was never disputed. The defense, however, asserted that his
involvement was an act of compulsion induced by PTSD. 20"
According to testimony at trial, Mr. Tindall returned from Vietnam with PTSD
symptoms brought about by his service in Vietnam.'" The stress reaction that caused him
to return to the behavior he had learned in Vietnam was precipitated by the psychological
devastation following the rejection of his application for a pilot's license.'"
The defense in Tindall asserted that the defendant had "action addiction" that led
him to engage in a series of dangerous endeavors, such as sky diving and stunt flying."'
Under the defense's theory the feeling of loss, rejection and helplessness that followed the
destruction of his goal to become a charter pilot caused him to revert back to the method
of surviving he learned in Vietnam .2" He became part of a dangerous para-military
operation that involved his military superior and in which all the participants adopted the
same roles they had in Vietnam. 2"
A federal jury ultimately found that Mr. Tindall was not legally responsible for his
action during the six months he participated in the scheme. He was found not guilty by
the reason of insanity in September, 1980. 210
The defendant in State v. Gregory 2 " was charged with eight counts of false imprison-
ment and four counts of assault arising from an incident in a bank in Silver Spring,
Maryland. 212
 On Feb. 9, 1977, Stephen Gregory entered the bank armed with two rifles
and announced he was not holding up the bank.213
 He told hostages, including children
that they could leave and offered beer to the remaining hostages.2 " He wore a business
20 ' Id. See The "Bombshell" Defense, supra note 6.
202 See Wilson & Ziglebaum, supra note 35 at 74.
203 Vietnam Stress Defense A Winner in Drug Case, supra note 9, at 4, col. 2.
2" Id. ai col, 1
205 Id .
2" 1)r. John Wilson testified that Tindall had a need to release anger and rage that resulted
from the futility and horror of Vietnam. See discussion of Tindall in Note, supra note 6, at 113 n.130.
2° 7 Id. at 112-113. Testimony at trial indicated that Tindall had become highly excitable during
missions in Vietnam. Upon his return to the United States, Tindall hung his bed from the ceiling and
decorated his room to resemble his quarters in Vietnam. Id. at 112 & n.124. His hands twitched as if
he were firing rockets, much in the same way he did when he was flying in Vietnam. Id. at 112 n.122.
"8 Dr. Wilson testified that "he [Tindall] engaged in the alleged crime because in many ways it
represented another mission to him. It has all the elements of a combat mission in many ways."
Record, day 4, at 141, United States v. Tindall, Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980) (testimony of
Dr. John Wilson). riled in Note, supra note 6, at 112.
208 Note, supra note 6, at 113.
210 Id. at 111. See also Vietnam Stress Defense a Winner in Drug Case, supra note 9, at 4.
"' No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. 1979). Gregory is discussed in Milstein &
Snyder, .orpra note 6.
212 Id. See Defense Presentence Report at 1, filed in State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct.
Montgomery County, Md. 1979).
Gregory is discussed in this section of this article because even though he was charged with
assault, the defendant made no attempt to harm bank customers and the episode took place over a
relatively long period of time.
213 id .
214 Id. at 22.
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suit with a diamond tie tac and cufflinks. In his pockets he had military ribbons and
awards. 2 "
Over the next five hours, Gregory fired some 250 rounds of ammunition at the air
vents in the roof, and at other inanimate objects and noises in the bank because in the
words of the defendant in the bank, "in the bush you couldn't see the enemy but could
only hear them. "218 He allowed police to bring food and beer to the hostages and
eventually released all but one 2 17 Finally, he allowed himself to be taken into custody by
the police SWAT team that had surrounded the bank. After the ordeal, he wrote letters of
apology to the hank and the hostages 2's
Stephen Gregory was first tried
	 1977. The issue was whether the psychological
condition from which he suffered was the sort that would constitute legal insanity. 212 At
that time, of course, PTSD had not yet appeared in the diagnostic materials and there was
disagreement over whether or not Mr. Gregory's behavior was related to a mental illness
arising from combat experiences. 220
 Gregory was convicted, but that conviction was
reversed on appeal."'
After his appeal, Mr. Gregory elected to plead guilty to the charges pursuant to an
agreement with the prosecutor. 222 At sentencing, the defense presented a report that
explained the defendant's behavior in terms of PTSD reaction?"
According to the'psychiatrist who examined the defendant, his behavior in the bank
was directly related to his feelings that he was "a very, very bad person because he
survived the ambush in 1969 when others died. . .."2" When he came back from Viet-
nam, this guilt about surviving caused him to be depressed, suicidal, and guilt ridden.
Prior to the bank incident he had made three attempts to commit suicide?" Thus, the
psychiatrist linked the behavior in the bank to the defendant's experiences as a platoon
leader who wanted to protect his patrol in much the same way he "protected" the
unharmed hostages, 220
 In addition, in the bank, his guilt caused him to point his gun at
himself and to talk about suicide. 227
 Under the court's order Stephen Gregory was put on
probation and was required to receive treatment for PTSD.228
Cases such as Tindall and Gregory illustrate that PTSD can govern behavior in ways
other than the typical "combat flashback." The subtleties of the impact of PTSD on client
behavior create an obligation upon attorneys who represent Vietnam veteran clients to
take particular care before rejecting a possible PTSD connection as an explanation for
client behavior.
Id.
216 /d.
217 Id .
218 Id. at 23.
2 ' 9 Milstein Sc Snyder, supra note 6, at 87.
225 See supra note 212.
221
 State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. 1979).
222 See infra text accompanying notes 318- 19.
223 Id.
224 'Traumatic War Neurosis," DISCHARGE UPGRADE NEWSLETTER (March 1979) (Published by
Veterans' Education Project, Wash., D.C.).
21' See testimony of Dr. Steven Sonnenberg, State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery
County, Md. 1979), excerpt of testimony from March 2, 1979, at 8.
226 Id. at 10.
"7 Id.
228 See infra text accompanying notes 319-42.
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C. Other Applications of PTSD at Trial
The previous examples of trials in which PTSD was introduced were all based upon
the use of PTSD as part of the affirmative defense of insanity.'" It would be incorrect,
however, to conclude that the insanity defense is necessarily the most appropriate method
for raising PTSD in a litigation context. Moreover, the continuing attacks on the insanity
defense may reduce its utility in the future. For example, at this point, one state has
"outlawed" the insanity defense,'" several others have introduced guilty but mentally ill
verdicts; 23 ' and other jurisdictions have shifted the burden of proof to the defendant."'
Even the American Bar Association (ABA) and the A PA and the AMA have suggested
substantial alterations in the insanity standard. 233
In addition to any changes in the defense itself, an attorney who considers asserting
an insanity defense must not ignore tactical limitations that are implicit in the defense. For
example, the general hostility to the insanity defense may make jury selection very
difficult.'" Furthermore, many jurors may be particularly unsympathetic to Vietnam
veterans."' Also, in spite of the public furor over the verdict in the trial of would-be
assassin John Hinckley, it is not always clear that defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity are substantially better off than those convicted. Often, defendants will merely he
involuntarily hospitalized rather than be imprisoned.'" Once hospitalized or incarcer-
ated, there is no guarantee that the client will be treated for PTSD.237 In addition, the
stigma of being found not guilty by reason of insanity is no small burden for veterans who
already feel ostracized by society to bear. in light of these built-in limitations in the
insanity defense, it may be necessary to consider other alternatives for presenting PTSD.
Even in states where the insanity defense, per se, has been eliminated, the necessity of
proving the mental element of crime remains."" Because mental stale or 'rums rea , is an
essential element of the definition of crime 2 39 PTSD may be a factor in the proof of the
"° See supra notes 133-85.
230 IDAHO Cone § 18-207 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
"' ILL. ANN. STAT. Cli. 38 § 6-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1972-1982 PP.); IND. CODE § 35.35-1-1 (1981);
MICH. COMP. 1_,Aws ANN. § 768.20a (1975).
232 MINN. R. Glum. P. 20.02 subd. 6(5)(b). See also Staler v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. 1983).
233 See generally ABA Policy 071 the Insanity Defuse, Approved by The House of Delegates, Feb. 9,
1983, See also Insanity Defense Reexamined, 22 SCIENCE 994 (1983).
234 Counsel in People v. Wood carried out extensive pre-trial interviews to determine community
attitudes regarding the defendant's psychological condition and his ability to control behavior. The
survey resulted in a motion requesting the judge to ask particular questions that would reveal juror
attitudes about these issues. People v. Wood, No, 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ili. May 5, 1982).
The problems ofjury selection may be even more difficult in light of the public outcry following the
jury verdict in United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Jurors, for example, may
wish to avoid the sort of recrimination directed at the Hinckley jury.
233 For a discussion of public perceptions of Vietnam veterans, see MYTHS AND REAI.MES: A
STUDY or ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAM ERA VETERANS, prepared by Louis Harris and Assoc. for the
V.A. (July 1980).
2" See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also les Just Gonna Be Insanity:
Tears, Anger, and Remorse at the Trial of John Hinckley, TIME, May 24, 1982, at 31; Insane on All Counts:
After Torturous Deliberations, A jury Acquits John Hinckley, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 22; Is The System Guilty?
A Stunning Verdict Puts the Insanity Defense on Trial, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26.
237 In Heads, even after the verdict of not guilty, Mr. Heads was not admitted to treatment. jack,
supra note 6, at 19.
231 IDAHO CODE § 18-207(c) (1983 Supp.). Ser generally Erlinder, Mens Rea Due Process and the
Supreme Court: Toward a Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, Am. J. Calm. LAW 163 (1981); Milstein &
Snyder, supra note 6.
230 See Erlinder, supra note 238, at 165.
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necessary "mental element" of an offense. For example, a specific intent crime such as
attempted murder, which usually requires the specific intent to kill the victim, may be
attacked by demonstrating that the defendant's actions resulted from PTSD, not from an
intention to kill the victim. 240 Alternatively, in jurisdictions which recognize other psycho-
logical defenses, such as diminished capacity, PTSD has obvious importance. 24 t Even in
cases in which the defendant does not meet the definition of insanity, a reduction in
criminal culpability is possible and should he explored. 242
Another possible legal theory to which PTSD may be relevant is self defense. The
Model Penal Code would allow the defendant to demonstrate that his or her responses
were subjectively reasonable. 243 The use of PTSD in this context might parallel that of the
"battered spouse syndrome" that has been used to explain a female defendant's violent
acts towards her spouse. 2" It may be possible to show that a particular type of provocation
caused a PTSD-type reaction in which the defendant left attacked and responded in-
voluntarily or even reasonably given his or her experiences. In this circumstance, the
existence of PTSD would again make the whole of a defendant's life relevant to show his
state of mind at the time of the occurence. 245
Perhaps the most likely alternative theory for the introduction of PTSD at trial lies in
the well accepted, but little used defense of automatism. Automatism is grounded in the
notion that "a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing"
cannot be criminally liable 246 Unlike insanity, automatism is not necessarily grounded in
mental illness 2 47 and commitment issues are not raised in its presentation. 24 '
The theory of automatism arises from the historically-required-volitional act, a neces-
sary element of any criminal conviction!" Although some cases refer to automatism as
relating to the mental state of the defendant, 25° the defense is more properly understood
'4° Schulz, supra note 4. For example, in State v. Marshall, No. 83-214-CF-A-01 (Cir. Ct. Sarasota
County, Fla. 1983), the jury returned a verdict of second degree, rather than first degree, homocide.
PTSD had been raised as a defense at the trial. The result of conviction of this lesser offense was that
the punishment was incarceration, rather than capital. Id.
241 The concept of "diminished capacity" as a defense was central to the outcome of the trial of
former Black Panther Huey Newton. See People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
PTSD may also be a causative factor in reducing culpable mental state. See People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 21, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1978).
242 See Schulz, supra note 4, at 2404.
242 The Model Penal Code, for example, suggests only that an actor "believes" that the use of
force is necessary. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1). See generally W. LAFAVE 8c A. Scarr, CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 53, at 393-94 (1972). For a discussion of a subjective theory of self-defense as applied to women, see
E. BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF DEFENSE CASES (1981).
2" See Ihn-Tamar v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979). In another case, the
Supreme Court of the state of Washington struck down a jury instruction which prevented the jury
from considering self defense "in light of all of the circumstances." See State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d
221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
245
	
supra notes 243-44, and supra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
246 P.A. WHITLOCK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 119 (1963). See D,A. Apos-
tle, The Unconscious Defense as Applied to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 Buil., AABL 426, 1980, at 429.
2.47 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL. LAW 644 (1983).
248 Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351, 358 (Okla. Cir. 1962).
2" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 62.01 (Comment, text draft No. 4, 1955). For a discussion of the
constitutional and historical basis for the actus reas requirement, see Erlinder, supra note 238, at
166-75.
"° People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 21, 26-27, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 (1978).
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as the absence of a volitional act because the body movement in question is not volun-
tary."'
There is substantial support for the assertion of automatism in both statutory 252 and
case authority. 253 It has been described clinically as resulting from conditions such as
epileptic and post epileptic states, 254 "clouded states of consciousness associated with
organic brain disease, concussional states following head injuries, and less commonly, in
some types of schizophrenic and acute emotional disturbance." 255
In at least one case, People v. Lisnow, an appellate court has ruled that the failure to
allow testimony regarding automatism or unconscious acts in an early PTSD-type case was
reversable error.256 hi People v. Lisnow, the appellate department of the Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, held that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow evidence of
automatism and evidence regarding Vietnam in a battery case involving a Vietnam
veteran.257.
 According to the court, the defendant struck a maitre d' in a restaurant for
"no apparent reason." He then went into the parking lot and engaged in other,
unspecified "acts of violence." 259 At trial the defendant testified that he had experienced
lapses of memory and "dream like" experiences since returning from Vietnam in 1968.
He also testified that he attributed these conditions to his service in Vietnam and that he
had been receiving therapy for this condition. 26°
A VA psychiatrist testified that the defendant had no memory of' the incident and was
in a dissociative fugue-like state brought on by traumatic neurosis due to combat. The
defendant was "reliving a particular combat experience he had in Vietnam.""' The
psychiatrist also testified that the dissociative or fugue-like state would cause a person to
be unaware of his behavior.262 The trial judge struck the testimony of the psychiatrist and
instructed the jury to disregard it. 263 He also instructed the jury to disregard the defen-
dant's testimony about Vietnam.264 The court's reasoning was apparently grounded in the
misapprehension that the existence of a mental disorder, traumatic neurosis, precluded a
defense based in unconsciousness." 5
The appellate court reviewed cases where the relationship between soundness of
2" See discussion of the "act" requirement in W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 243, at 177
(1972).
252 ARIZ, REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-201 (1983) (requiring a voluntary act for criminal culpability);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-201(2)(1983) (persons committing acts without being conscious of the actions
are not capable of committing crimes); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.010(6); OKLA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 21 §
152(6); S.D. Cone LAWS § 22-3-1(5).
25' Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 171-75 (3d Cir. 1960) (epilepsy); People v.
Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 112-17, 142 P.2d 935, 436-40 (1943) (same); Fain v. Commonwealth,
78 Ky. 183, 184-93 (1879) (somnambulism).
25*
	 WHITLOCK, supra note 246, at 120. See also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d
169, 171 (3d Cir. 1960); People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App.2d 110, 112, 142 P. 2d 435, 436-37 (1943).
255 F.A. WHITLOCK, supra note 246, at 120. See also F.L. WILLIAMS, AUTOMATISM, ESSAYS IN
CRIMINAL SCIENCE (Mueller ed. 1961).
256 People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d Stipp. 21, 26-27, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623 (1978).
"7 Id. at 23, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
256
Id.
2114 Id,
241 Id.
262 Id .
262 Id .
264 Id. at 24, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
Id. at 25, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
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mind and the unconsciousness defense was raised . 266 The court looked to People v.
Wetntore 2" for an analysis that would resolve the apparent division of authority on this
issue.268 The court noted that Wetmore required that evidence of a defendant's mental
state be admitted at the stage in a trial when criminal liability must be established.'"
According to the Lisnow court, the requirement that both intent and additional act be
proved by the state implied that a defendant should be able to introduce evidence of
unconsciousness to negate culpability irrespective of the cause of the unconscious state of
mind?"
As the above cases demonstrate, PTSD may be applied in criminal litigation in a
number of different ways. In any of these contexts, however, it is crucial that an attorney
present a thorough and detailed body of evidence to advance any PTSD-relatecl legal
theory. To assist practitioners confronted with the task of gathering evidence to support
an argument based on PTSD, the next section of this article examines some of the
concerns which must be addressed as an attorney prepares to try a PTSD case.
III. STRATEGY AND TACTICS  IN PTSD LITIGATION
Because PTSD is attributable 10 specific, identifiable incidents which are external to
die inclividual,27 ' it is possible to describe in a logical, and detailed manner, the events
which support the conclusion that PTSD is a determinative factor in client behavior. 272 If
the diagnosis is accurate, a mental health professional should be able to point. to objective
data regarding the defendant's behavior before and after the traumatic event which
would lead to the conclusion that PTSD is present. 213 It should also be possible to point to
specific aspects of the traumatic experience itself which would logically lead to the
conclusion that the behavior at issue at trial was a product of the traumatic experience. 274
This aspect of the expert testimony is obviously crucial and may require the services of a
specialist who has made a study of p-rsn.27,
A survey of cases, in which factfinders have concluded that a defendant should not be
held responsible for criminal conduct, reveals that these cases have in common the
detailed presentation of events from four distinct periods of the defendant's life:
a) the period preceeding the traumatic event in which there is little evidence
of anti-social behavior or psychological impairment;
b) the traumatic event itself' in which the defendant's experiences in Vietnam
are explained in great. detail;
c) the period following the traumatic event during which behavioral changes
are observed;
cl) the exact circumstances of the offense in which similarities to the t rauma-
tic event are described and explained.
'66 Id. at 25, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 623 - 24.
267 22 Cal. 3d 318, 149 Cal. Rptr, 265, 583 P.2d 1308 (1978).
2" People v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d Stipp. 21, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1981).
2" Id. at 25, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24.
270 id.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 19-64.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 129- 85.
2" Id.
274 Id.
2 75 PTSD is often misdiagnosed. See supra text accompanying note 7. See also Miller v. State, 338
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1983) and Ford, supra note 6, at 438.
2" These are conclusions of the author based upon a study of the presentation of evidence in
several unreported PTSD cases, including the cases described in this article.
276
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In the cases in which defendants have been found not to be responsible for their conduct,
the events from each of these periods have been used as the basis for a diagnosis by
mental health experts and have been corroborated by evidence from sources independent
of the defendant.'"
The periods before and after Vietnam are often described by co-workers, family
members, friends, or a spouse and may be documented by various records including
school records, military records, criminal or arrest records where they exist and hospital
records. The goal is to corroborate with objective evidence all of the factual data upon
which the diagnosis is based and to demonstrate the changes in behavior that followed the
Vietnam experience.27" Failure to introduce this evidence will leave the expert's diagnosis
open to attack on the grounds that it is the result of self-serving statements by the client.'"
Once the diagnosis of PTSD has been established the remaining question to be
resolved is whether the defendant's functioning was so impaired to the extent that a
reduction in liability or penalty is warranted under the laws of the jurisdiction.'" Because
PTSD does not effect all Vietnam veterans, and because the severity of PTSD reactions
varies from individual to individual depending on their particular ability to cope with the
traumatic events to which they were exposed, most successful PTSD defenses have
presented very detailed descriptions of the Vietnam experience of the individual in
question and an extensive analysis of the factors surrounding the criminal conduct. 28 '
Typically, these descriptions of the Vietnam experience and the details of the circum-
stances surrounding the crime will allow an expert. in PTSD to explain quite logically both
the similarities between the emotional or environmental circumstances at the time of the
crime and those experienced by the veteran in Vietnam."' The expert may also establish
the relationship between the stimulus of the criminal conduct and the behavioral re-
sponses to such stimuli learned and internalized clueing the defendant's Vietnam experi-
ence.
The need to make these links between the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the particular experiences of die defendant. in Vietnam requires meticulous examina-
tion and presentation of facts. These crucial facts, however, may be difficult to discover.
Details of the offense and the circumstances leading to the offense may or not be available
from the defendant. Even if a defendant is capable of recalling these events a prudent
practitioner should corroborate all potentially relevant facts through other witnesses or
records.203
A more difficult problem arises in attempting to "re-create" the Vietnam experience.
Often veterans will consciously remember only fragments of their Vietnam experience
and many important events will be suppressed entirely .2" In addition, it is fairly common
for veterans to deny vociferously airy connection between their criminal conduct and their
service experience in order to avoid the further stigma of mental illness or the pain of
recollection.'" As a result, it is imperative that attorneys make every attempt to recoil-
222 See supra text accompanying notes 77- 182.
273
	 See also Ford, supra note 6, at 437.
279
	 Railman, Problems of Diagnosis and Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, 1 BEHAV. Set. & LAw, No. 3, at 115 (1983).
2" See supra text accompanying notes 118-228.
201
	 supra text accompanying notes 129 - 228.
282 Id .
2l L3 Id. See Raifman, supra note 279, at 127.
2" See text accompanying note 162, supra. See also Ford, supra note 6, at 437.
2" The problem of veteran denial of PTSD is evident in State v. Serrato, 424 So. 2d 214 (La.
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struct the defendant's experience and to help the veteran through the process of dredg-
ing up the past in a manner that will be both productive and therapeutic. These methods
may include counselling or hypno-therapy for the veteran and extensive research by the
attorney about the conditions of service in Vietnam?" In addition to working with the
client, it is possible to reconstruct much of a veteran's service record through military
records and through other veterans. Although many records from Vietnam were origi-
nally classified and some remain 50,2" it is possible to obtain reports such as:
a) service and military medical records;
b) operational reports of major campaigns;
c) unit reports and day-by-day logs of various units;
d) records of VA benefits or claims;
e) news reports published contemporaneously with the war in U.S. newspap-
ers;
I) maps of terrain and photographs 2""
In some cases, films about Vietnam and films about PTSD have been admitted to illustrate
the basis for an expert's opinions.'" Photos, maps and other visual aids have also been
used to explain the reality of the defendant's experience."°
Perhaps the most crucial factor in the presentation of the Vietnam experience is the
description of the conditions of service by other veterans who served with the defendant.
In virtually every case in which the defense has resulted in a reduction of liability or
punishment, the defense was able to call to the stand other veterans who could paint in
graphic detail the experiences they shared with the delendant. 29 ' This testimony has the
1983). In Serrato, two psychiatrists testified that the original diagnosis of the defendant by one of the
psychiatrists was incorrect because the defendant had denied PTSD symptoms. Id. at 223 n.9. The
second psychiatrist made the correct diagnosis and both psychiatrists agreed that the defendant's
conduct was PTSD-related. Id. at 223. In spite of this testimony the trial court and the Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that discovery of the PTSD connection required a
new trial. Id.
286 See supra note 162.
2" In State v. Jensen, No. CR 75687 (Maricopa County, Ariz. 1983), defense counsel learned
that the defendant's combat records in Cambodia were not available until 1977, and some records are
still classified. Conversation with Victor Aronow, Esq., Counsel fir Defendant, Jan. 19,.1984.
298 These documents and descriptive materials are admissible under three major evidentiary
theories: (1) a defendant's military records may be admitted under the business records exceptions to
the hearsay rule, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 304-14 (1977); (2) records relating specifically to a
defendant's military or medical history are relevant as the basis for expert testimony, see MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 304-14 (1977); (3) photographs, diagrams and maps are demonstrative evidence which
can be used by a witness to better explain his testimony, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 304-14 (1977).
2"9 Jack, supra note 6, at 8.
21") In People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. May 5, 1982), the defense team
used snapshots from the defendant's album, operational maps of Vietnam and visual aids to describe
PTSD, the Vietnam experience and the conditions which gave rise to the PTSD reaction.
29I every case in which a PTSD defense resulted in a reduction in penalty or liability,
testimony about Vietnam from other veterans played an important role in the trial. See supra notes
129-210.
In several recently reported cases, evidence of the details of the Vietnam experience was not
introduced at trial and the defendants were convicted as charged in jury trials. See United States v.
Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983);
Stader v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. 1983); State v. Sharp, 418 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1983); State v.
Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1983); State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983); Nash v.
State, 651 N.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1983).
In United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983), evidence of the Vietnam experience
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effect of corroborating the facts upon which the diagnosis was based and helping the
factfinder to understand how it felt to be in the Vietnam war, thus establishing the
connection between Vietnam service and the behavior during the offense."'
Although this evidence may be very beneficial, it may be the most difficult to develop.
Often defendants will not have seen their comrades in arms for over ten years. In
Vietnam, nicknames were common and home-towns were not always mentioned. Al-
though this is true of military service generally, this is particularly true of the Vietnam
experience because most soldiers served in Vietnam for less than one year and the
composition of each unit changed regularly. Asa result, few soldiers maintained ties with
each other or veterans' organizations when they returned home.'" Nevertheless, a num-
ber of attorneys have devised rather ingenious methods for tracking clown their clients'
compatriots including publishing ads in veterans' magazines, making use of' VA facilities
for contacting veterans wlio have received benefits, culling operational reports, searching
phone books, making use of veterans' organizations, securing the help of a local con-
gressional office, working with the local Vet's Center counselors and contacting the
Veterans' Law Center in Washington, D.C. for advice or research.'"
Other aspects of PTSD cases which may require particular attention by attorneys
include jury selection and treatment concerns."' While no unitary theory of jury selection
can be advocated at this point, several practitioners have suggested that developing a
profile for jury selection is an extremely important part of the litigation.2" It has been
suggested that the persons who were of draft. age during the Vietnam War or persons
who had close personal attachments to persons of draft age may be the [Host appropriate
jurors."' Even jurors who express skepticism or-hostility about PTSD may, in fact, be
good jurors, if they fit the previously mentioned criteria. A proper presentation of PTSD
will not require general acceptance of PTSD, rather it will require a determination of
whether the facts presented in a particular case support the diagnosis for a particular
veteran. It should also be noted that at least one practitioner has commented that she was
surprised to discover that her assumption that Vietnam vets would be viewed unsym-
pathetically by the public at large may have been incorrect?" The experience of the
attorneys in State v. Cohea 299 was that a substantial portion of the venire was aware of the
psychological problems experienced by Vietnam veterans and also felt that Vietnam
was saved for rebuttal on the theory that it would rebut any inference that the defendant was lying
about the Vietnam experience. Id. at 1115-52. The trial court refused to allow the testimony,
however, because the prosecution did not directly challenge the defendant's veracity. As a result, the
most graphic sort of evidence available to the defense never was admitted. Id. Burgess demonstrates
one reason that the entirety of the defense case should be presented to support the diagnosis.
232 See infra text accompanying notes 304 11.
2"3 A survey of the attorneys who have litigated PTSD cases conducted by the author shows that
locating other veterans can often be very difficult but is essential to properly present the case.
2"4 The techniques mentioned are a composite of investigatory approaches used by the author in
preparing People a. Wood, and methods use by attorneys interviewed by the author. See also supra note
162 (discussing the use of hypnosis in stimulating recall of the Vietnam experience).
2" See Jack, supra note 6, at 12 - 13 and 17- 18.
2" For suggested techniques in jury instructions see C. BOARDMAN, JURY WORK (1983) (a
publication of the National Jury Project).
"I Jack, supra note 6, at 14. Telephone interview with Joyce Ladar, Esq., attorney for Charles
Cohea, San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 27, 1984.
2"8 Telephone interview with Joyce Ladar, Esq., attorney for Charles Cohea, San Francisco, Cal.,
Jan. 27, 1984.
299 No. 1 Grim. 21566 (Sup. Ct. Contra Costa County, Cal. Nov. 1983).
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veterans may have been treated unfairly. Moreover, in several cases, Vietnam veterans
were accepted as jurors in spite of their initial hostility to PTSD, because of their
enhanced ability to understand the conditions in Vietnam.50°
Finally, practitioners should be aware that an unspoken issue may be the amenability
of the defendant to treatment. 301 It may he difficult for judges or jurors to absolve a
defendant of liability without a clear understanding that. PTSD is an eminently treatable
condition."' In explaining what PTSD is and how it is manifested, it may be wise to
describe the effectivenes'S- of the treatment offered through the VA and other sources and
to make clear that PTSD is a psychological condition that could happen to anyone who has
experienced an extremely traumatic event. Failure to do so may create the inaccurate
impression that veterans are fundamentally different from others or that veterans ex-
periencing PTSD symptoms are incurable and thus a continuous threat. Indeed, once a
veteran discovers the source of his or her psychological difficulties and receives counsel-
ling, a reduction in symptoms is common.3"
A case which provides a graphic example of the effects of a failure to insure dint the
jury completely understand the effects of PTSD and the failure to introduce specific
details of die Vietnam experience is State v. Feide. 304 Mr. Felde is a Vietnam veteran who
was convicted of the murder of a police officer by a jury and was sentenced to deat.h. 305
Extensive expert testimony regarding the validity of PTSD as a diagnostic category and its
effect on Wayne Felde was introduced at trial, but no evidence of the Vietnam experience
was introduced to establish the relationship between Vietnam service and the shooting
incident. 306 On appeal, defense counsel made clear that other veterans who served with
Mr. Felde were not located until after the trial."'
3" People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. May 1982); People v. Cohea, No. I
Crim. 21566 (Sup. Ct. Contra Costa County, Cal. Nov. 1983). In People v. Wood, for example, the
author and the defense team agreed to accept a Vietnam veteran juror who vociferously objected to
the validity of PTSD. During trial, the juror began to evidence his own PTSD symptoms during the
trial testimony about Vietnam. A similar strategy was reported to the author by attorneys Wellborn
Jack, Esq. and Joyce Ladar, Esq., attorneys for Charles Heads and Charles Cohea. See supra notes
129 - 50, 299, and infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text. See also infra note 301.
3" This is a conclusion of the author based upon interviews with jurors and prospective
members of the venire. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the National Jury
Project, Minneapolis, Minn., for their assistance in framing a juror interview strategy which revealed
underlying juror attitudes. Because not all jurors have personally experienced Vietnam and because
PTSD is, in fact, a psychological condition that may affect anyone, it is tactically unwise to suggest
that PTSD is a condition that is limited to Vietnam veterans, or that all veterans suffer from PTSD.
The jury must understand that PTSD arises From many sorts of traumatic events so that they can
identify their own reactions to trauma, if not to the particular sort of trauma experienced by the
defendant. No juror should ever be left with the erroneous impression that all veterans suffer from
PTSD or that the reactions are identical. The presentation of the case should be particularized to the
experiences of the individual on trial.
3°2 See Ford, supra note 6, at 440.
3°1 See generally Towards an Understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders Among Vietnam Veterans,
Testimony of Dr. John Wilson before the U.S. Senate Subcomtnittee on Veterans' Affairs, Mar. 21,
1980.
904 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
at 375.
306 1d. at 376. See supra notes 276- 79 and accompanying text for a discussion on the importance
of presenting evidence that links Vietnam service and the criminal incident.
3°7 State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 396 (Li. 1982). The conviction and sentence of defendant
Felde were affirmed. Id. at 398.
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Some indication of the significance of this missing evidence may be seen in the moral
turmoil revealed in a statement made by the jury foreperson when rendering the verdict:
We, the jury recognize the contribution of our Vietnam veterans and
those who lost their lives in Vietnam. We feel that the trial of Wayne Felde has
brought to the forefront those extreme stress disorders prevalent among
thousands of our veterans.
We have attempted through great emotional and mental strain to serve
and preserve the judicial branch of our government by serving on this Jury.
This trial will forever remain indelibly imprinted on our minds, hearts and
consciences.
Through long and careful deliberation, through exposure to all evi-
dence, we felt that Mr. Felde was aware of right and wrong when Mr.
Thonipkin's life was taken. However; we pledge ourselves to contribute what-
ever we can to best meet the needs of our veterans. 308
Apparently the jury was deeply moved by the evidence of the experience of Vietnam
veterans in general but was unconvinced that Wayne Felde's conduct was governed by his
reactions to Vietnam. Perhaps a detailed analysis of his Vietnam experience would have
made it possible for the jury to draw the parallels found in cases such as Wood and
Heads . 3 D9
The difficulty experienced by attorneys in representing veterans suffering from
PTSD can also be seen in Felde. After his conviction Wayne Felde was the only witness at
his sentencing hearing. 310 At that hearing Mr. Felde asked the jury to help him by ending
his life. The following is part of his statement to the jury:
All I can say to you all is.... I would advise you to return the death
penalty in this case.... Keith Oliver, 1 know your cousin Joe Oliver. We were
cell partners for about eight (8) months  Mr. Coker, I know one of your
good friends, too, Tommy Strange. We picked this Jury and we picked them
on intelligence. 1 consider all of you people intelligent so I hope you will take
my advice, return the death penalty... .
1 think other deaths will result. ... And that's why I suggested it, to
prevent. it from happening. They would be on your conscience if you can't
return it. Now, Int not trying to put you all in a bad position but you are all
taking other people's lives in your hands, along with mine, so I think you
should return it. I don't think no more needs to be said, Mr. Thomas. They're
upset. Thank you.
I'm not coming out and threatening anybody because that's not what it is.
A walking time bomb, that's what it is. Somebody else will die as a result of it if
I'm not put to death, I'm sure. It's happened twice in eight years. There's
been ten years of proof shown to you. I don't know where it went so, please,
return that. I think, as countrymen, you owe me that much. I did my part.
Please do yours. Okay
His attorney argued that Wayne Felde should be given his wish. The jury complied 3 12
The preparation and presentation of a case involving PTSD can be complicated.
3" Id. at 380.
"3 See supra notes 129-85 and accompanying text.
31° State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
3 " Id. at 394.
912 Id. at 375.
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Nevertheless, the results of a methodical presentation of evidence to a court and jury can
be extremely beneficial for a client. The benefits of a proper application of PTSD in a
criminal case, however, are not limited to the raising of p-rsD during trial. PTSD may be
raised in a client's behalf in other contexts. The next section of this article explores the use
of PTSD in two of those contexts: plea negotiations and alternative sentencing.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF FISO
A. PTSD In Plea Negotiations
In addition to cases in which PTSD has been introduced at trial, there are several
reported cases in which PTSD has played an important role in reaching agreement on
treatment or sentencing. 3 ' 3 As has been observed elsewhere, such agreements are far
more likely in cases in which the defendant has not injured others. 3 " Other factors,
however, including the success of PTSD defenses, the existence of treatment programs
and the defendant's background, are also likely to be conducive of a favorable settle-
ment.313
For example, in one Massachusetts case, weapons charges against a defendant were
dropped completely. 319 A veteran who had entered a veteran's cemetery and had begun a
frenzied incident, received treatment for PTSD and the charges against. him were (Lis-
rnissed.317 Another negotiated settlement occurred in a case in which a defendant. had
held hostages in a bank for several hours. 319 Although he was armed and had fired at a
number of objects during the incident, no one was injured during the episode. In that.
case, a settlement. was reached whereby the defendant. was placed on probation. 319
The problem faced by veterans who plead guilty to an offense without having benefit.
of an evaluation for PTSD or a proper presentation of PTSD evidence in sentencing can
be seen in a number of cases in which veterans have sought to withdraw earlier guilty
pleas 320 In Scarborough v. U.S. ,321 for example, the defendant apparently filed a pro se
post-conviction petition to vacate a plea entered prior to the publication of' DSM 1 IL The
defendant asserted that he failed to raise an insanity defense because earlier doctors'
reports failed to . recognize his PTSD condition which was first diagnosed in 1981. 322 In
rejecting the defendant's petition, the court revealed the importance of properly explain-
ing the history of the development of the PTSD diagnosis. The court concluded that the
differences between the PTSD diagnosis in 1981 and a Navy medical report from July 8,
313 State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28, 1979); Commonwealth
v. Coughlin (Mass.), discussed in Agonies of Viet Battle Still flaunts Many Vet,, Chi. Sun-Times, May 10,
1981, at 38, col. 1.
3 " Milstein & Snyder, supra note 6, at 87.
315 See infra notes 230 - 43 and accompanying text,
31" Note, supra note 6, at 113 n.136 (citing accounts or the case published in the Boston Globe,
Jan. 23, 1982, at 18, col. 3.)
317 id .
31' State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28, 1979). For a detailed
discussion of this case see supra notes 211-28 and accompanying text.
31" Milstein & Snyder, supra note 6, at 87.
3" See generally United States v. Lake, 709 F.2d 43 (11th Cir. 1983); Scarborough v. United
States, 683 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1983); State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (1983); State v.
Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404 (Tenn. 1983); Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656 (Wyo. 1983).
321 683 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1983).
322 Id. at 1324.
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1969 describing the defendant as suffering from an "anxiety reaction to combat and
recommending a medical discharge" was not a sufficient basis for overturning the trial
court decision not to allow a competency evaluation.313
The Scarborough court also rejected the veteran's contention that he was unaware of
the effects of his PTSD condition and that he was therefore denied an opportunity to
raise an insanity defense 324 The language of the opinion reflects the lack of appreciation
Ibr the development of the scientific understanding of PTSD and also reveals the skepti-
cism which the issue often engenders. The court stated:
Because of the existence of the 1969 medical report [of anxiety reaction to
combat], we are not convinced that Scarborough only recently became aware
of a possible defect in his medical condition. His Navy discharge sufficiently
delineates the symptoms and causes of his combat stress and even suggests
that the effects may be permanent.. Although Scarborough and his attorney
were aware of the report, no mention was ever made of a possible insanity
delense3 26
The court. in Scarborough obviously missed the point. It was not until 1980 at the earliest,
that either Scarborough, his attorney, or the psychiatrist who evaluated hint in 1981,
could have linked the criminal conduct to his Vietnam service under an accepted diagnos-
tic category . 326 Thus, Scarborough, also provides an example of the need to make a proper
record to allow the court to evaluate the applicability of PTSD to a given set of facts.
The dissent in Schmidt v. State, 327 further illustrates this point. In Schmidt, the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming upheld the trial court's denial of a post-conviction petition
seeking to withdraw a guilty plea entered a few months after the publication of DSM
but before a p-rsD evaluation of the veteran had been made. 328 In spite of an opinion of
legal insanity by Dr. John Yost, one of the foremost experts in the study and treatment of
PTSD, the majority refused to consider the new diagnosis as sufficient to set aside the
plea.32'.1 Justice Rose, in dissent, noted that the previous psychiatric evaluation had been
conducted by psychiatrists who did not have Dr. Yost's extensive PTSD experience. 33°
Thus, until the evaluation was conducted by an expert who could identify PTSD and
relate it to the criminal conduct, the defendant was not able to assert a meritorious
delense.33 ' Although Justice Rose did not mention that PTSD was so recently added to the
psychiatric literature that it would be unlikely that psychiatrists not specially trained in the
diagnosis would be able to properly evaluate a Vietnam veteran, he concluded that the
withdrawal of the plea would be "fair and just." 332
In contrast to Scarborough, in State v. Spawr, the Supreme Court of Tennessee when
presented with an appeal of the sentence imposed by the trial court recognized that a
subsequent PTSD diagnosis constituted grounds for remanding the case for another
probationary hearing. 333 The opinion contained a lengthy report from a psychologist who
323 Id. at 1325.
324 id ,
323 Id .
32B See supra text accompanying notes 66-102.
327
 668 P.2d 656 (Wyo. 1983).
32' Id. at 661.
3" Id. at 659-61
333 Id. at 662 (Rose, J., dissenting).
331 Id. at 663.
332 Id. at 661.
333 653 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn, 1983).
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had particular expertise in diagnosing and treating Vietnam veterans and who testified at
the sentencing hearing.334 In spite of an apparently hostile trial judge, who asked wit-
nesses that if the defendant had "shot your relative, would you be here making excuses
for him,"335 the supreme court remanded the case for a new probationary hearing with a
suggestion that if rehabilitation had been successful, 33€ probation, rather than incarcera-
tion, should be granted.
B. PTSD Treatment As An Alternative
Even after liability has attached, the relationship between PTSD and client behavior
can have a substantial impact upOn the sentence imposed by the court. Of course, the
relationship between the criminal behavior and PTSD must be established before a judge
is likely to take PTSD into account. Once that connection is made, however, treatment
options become available.337 PTSD treatment as an alternative to incarceration or as a part
of a reduced sentence has been applied to a variety of offenses including tax evasion, 338
drug offenses ,339 false imprisonrnent34° and assault. 34 '
A substantial step forward in the application of PTSD to sentencing issues was made
when California enacted a statute in 1982 that expressly allowed judges to consider PTSD
in sentencing and to mandate treatment alternatives when sentencing veterans.342 Al-
though specific references to treatment programs have been eliminated from the statute
by a 1983 amendment, the statute is extremely important because it constitutes legislative
recognition of the psychological and physical effects of Vietnam service. Thus, it provides
an additional basis for arguing that judges should take PTSD into account and adds
credence to both the existence of PTSD and the need to recognize special veteran
problems caused by PTSD. This statute provides an excellent model for the enactment of
334 Id. at 405-06.
335
	 at 406.
33(1 Id.
337 See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
sae
	 See also United States v. Oldham, 1P-82-280 Cr. (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1981).
nag See United States v. Tindall, Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980).
340 See State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28, 1981).
$°' See People v. Wood, supra note 103.
342 The 1982 statute had provided:
The Department of Corrections may enter into cooperative arrangements with the
Veterans Administration Vet Centers, the California Department of Veterans' Affairs,
the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs and programs under its jurisdiction,
and community-based veterans' organizations for the purpose of providing appropri-
ate counseling and treatment for those defendants who are specified ....
Section 2 of Stats. 1982 C. 964 (1982).
The statute now states:
In the case of any person convicted of a felony who would otherwise be sentenced to
state prison the court shall consider whether the defendant was a member of the
military forces of the United States who served in Vietnam and who suffers from
substance abuse or psychological problems resulting from that service. If the court
concludes that the defendant is such a person, the court may order the defendant
committed to the custody of federal correctional officials for incarceration for a term
equivalent to that which the defendant would have served in state prison. The court ...
may make such a commitment only if the defendant agrees to such a committment, the
court has determined that appropriate federal programs exist, and federal law au-
thorizes the receipt of the defendant under such conditions.
Cal. Penal Code § 1170.9 (1984).
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similar statutes in other states. In addition, legislation has been proposed in at least two
stateN that would require evaluations and treatment programs for veterans convicted of
criminal offenses. 343
The existence of a growing number of treatment facilities makes it possible to
provide a range of options to the court, other than incarceration. Treatment facilities
range From store front counselling centers to in-patient Facilities 344 The task of counsel is
to convince the court that treatment is likely to be successful and arrange the appropriate
treatment as an alternative. A good example of the presentation of PTSD in sentencing
can be seen in State v. Grego°, . 3" In Gregort, , Elliot Milstein and David Addlestone of the
Veterans Law Center presented an extensive pre-sentencing report that included psychi-
atric reports, military records and a lull client history. 346
 Both a psychologist and psychia-
trist. testified as to diagnosis and treatment and a V.A. representative agreed to accept the
defendant into a program 3 47
A similar problem confronts attorneys who have successfully asserted an insanity
defense.348 Most jurisdictions have a commitment procedure to determine the proper
treatment for those found not guilty by reason of insanity. 349 The attorney's task in this
setting is to develop a treatment plait that is suitable for his client. As mentioned earlier,
the defendant in the Wood case was found not guilty by reason of insanity of attempted
murder in the shooting of his foreman . 35°
 In that case, at both the trial and commitment-
hearing stage, counsel presented evidence that. the shooting was an isolated violent act . 3"
A psychiatrist from the Illinois Department of Mental Health testified that Mr. Wood was
not dangerous and recommended out-patient treatment provided by the V.A. 352 Mr.
Wood was released to receive counselling through a V.A. vet center near his hon ► e.353
V. POST-CONVICTION STRATECIES
For veterans convicted of offenses before the inclusion or PTSD in the DSM III in
1980, it is unlikely that PTSD was ever raised either as a defense or at sentencing. 354 For
these veterans, or for those convicted after 1980 who had attorneys unfamiliar with
3" Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a petition, Senate No. 762 (accompanied by hill, Senate
No. 762) (proposed by Sen. Jack Backman, 1983). Another bill is presently before the State Assembly
in the California Legislature. Assembly Bill No. 3723 (introduced by Richard Floyd, Feb. 17, 1984).
This bill is set forth in the Appendix.
$" Over 140 Veterans' Centers have been established by Congress in cities across the country to
provide counseling for veterans and their families. P.L. 92-66. See The Troubled Vietnam Vet,supra note
24, at 24; A Delayed Reaction: Vietnam Casualties at Home, supra note 53, at 40. PTSD treatment centers
have also been created at many veterans hospitals including residential programs. See H. Donder-
shine, supra note 29, at 4.
34s
	
19205 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28, 1979),
3" See generally Defense Pre-sentence Report, submitted in State v. Gregory, No. 19205 (Cir. Ct,
Montgomery County, Md. Feb. 28. 1979) (available from the Veterans' Law Center, Wash., D.C.).
347 Id.
"" Milstein & Snyder, supra note 6, at 87.
343
 In Illinois, for example, after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, a commitment
hearing is held to determine what treatment is appropriate for the defendant. fit.. ANN. STAT. ch . 38
§ 1005 - 2 - 4 (Smith-Hurd 1981).
340 See supra text accompanying note 169.
351 People v. Wood, supra note 103 (reported by the author who was co-counsel in the case).
3" Id.
353 Id.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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PTSD, strategies must be devised to raise PTSD in a context that will allow the criminal
justice or penal system to take PTSD into account in determining the appropriate
disposition of the case. Although there are no reliable figures on the number of Vietnam
veterans who are incarcerated, the estimates range from a low of 49,000 to as many as
125,000.355 When the number of veterans on parole, probation or awaiting trial arc added
to those figures, the size of the problem is readily apparent ass
Presently, few programs exist for incarcerated veterans to receive counselling or
treatment for PTSD while incarcerated. 357 A notable exception is the Veterans In Prison
Project administered by the V.A. hospital in Brentwood, California358 and efforts by the
Wisconsin Public Defender's Office to provide a veteran liaison to identify veterans and
help arrange treatment or counselling. 359 A study of incarcerated veterans in Massachu-
setts found that they were far less likely to have had criminal backgrounds than the
general prison population and that they experienced fewer adjustment problems in the
institution. 360 In the absence of institutional diagnosis, screening and treatment programs,
however, it is not at all certain that incarcerated veterans will be able to identify their own
difficulties as PTSD related, or that they will receive counselling."' Without such inter-
vention, there is little to insure that PTSD related criminal problems will not be repeated.
The best response to this situation is for attorneys and mental health professionals to
develop strategies that will allow the corrections system, or the judiciary, to respond to the
needs of veterans. These strategies would include presenting PTSD in parole hearings, in
motions to reduce sentence, or even in post conviction petititions.
An example of the sort of petition that might be submitted in support of' a parole
plan that takes PTSD into account was prepared by attorneys from the Veteran's Law
Center in a Virginia murder case. 362 In an extremely well documented presentation, the
petition makes the important point that had PTSD been understood at the time of the
offense, the outcome of the trial might have been different. 363 In addition, it sets forth a
description of PTSD with supporting footnotes, a complete history of the client, a
description of the homicide incident, the client's prison history and a parole plan. 364 The
petition is supported by a psychiatrist's report which makes the PTSD diagnosis and
includes a treatment plan, military records, family history, and post-Vietnam history. 66
An example of a somewhat successful motion to reduce sentence may be found in
U.S. v. Krutschewski,366 a case related to the Tindall case discussed earlier. 367 The defendant
3" See May Inmate Veterans: Hidden Casualties of A Lost War, 5 CoRREcTioNs 3, 4 (1979). These
figures reflect estimates made in the mid-1970's. Id.
35° As of 1974, 37,500 veterans were on parole, 250,000 veterans were on probation and 87,000
veterans were awaiting trial. Presidential Review Memorandum on Vietnam Era Veterans, H.R. RE:p. No.
38, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979).
97 See May, supra note 355. at 6.
3" Telephone interview with Mr. Bruce Pentland, Director, Veterans in Prison Project (Mar. 8,
1983).
359 Telephone interview with Mr. David Niblack, Esq., Madison, Wis., Wis. State Public Defen-
der (Mar. 9, 1983).
3" See May, supra note 355, at 6.
3" Id.
"2 REPORT 1'0 THE VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, NAT'I. VETERA NS' LAW CENTER, Wash., D.C., May
28, 1981 (available through Veterans' Law Center, 4900 Massachusetts Avenue, Wash., D.C., 20016).
363 Id. at 1.
3" Id. at 3-17, 28-34.
3" Id. at 37.
368 541 F. Supp. 142 (1982). See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, The Vietnam Veterans of
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in Krutschewski was convicted of multiple drug-related charges and was sentenced to
consecutive 5-year terms and a fine of $60,000. 36" The Vietnam Veterans of America, as
amicus curiae, filed a memorandum in support of the motion that persuasively sets fOrth
the argument that in the case of a veteran defendant an "appropriate" sentence must take
both military service and PTSD into account as substantial mitigating factors 388
 The trial
judge in Krutschewski, was empowered to hear the defendant's petition for a modification
of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3" The
success of the petition is demonstrated by the fact that the order issued by the court in
response to the motion allowed the defendant to be paroled prior to serving the minimum
one third of his sentence, as is usually required. 3"
Because Krutschewski was a federal prosecution, Rule 35 provided the legal basis for
filing the petition for a reduction in sentence. It should also be noted that Krutschewski was
a 'case in which PTSD had been raised both at trial and at sentencing. 372 Thus, unlike
many cases involving veterans, the relationship between PTSD and the criminal conduct
had already been established. 373 In jurisdictions where procedural devices analogous to
Rule 35 exist, petitions which include diagnosis and treatment plans similar to the
Veterans Law Center petition mentioned earlier may have some value. In many jurisdic-
tions, however, procedural mechanisms, such as Rule 35, which would allow reconsidera-
tion of sentences or determinations of liability, may not be available. 374
A possible strategy for allowing the court to consider the impact of PTSD in liability
and sentencing may exist in creative uses of post-trial petitions or habeas corpus petitions.375
One potential basis for raising PTSD in a post-conviction context arises from the relatively
recent inclusion of PTSD in the DSM 1113 76
 The certification of PTSD as an identifiable
psychological disorder may be presented in the nature of newly discovered evidence."'
Like a blood sample or fingerprint that defies classification until science develops
sufficiently to understand its significance, the relationship between PTSD and criminal
behavior could not have been introduced until after PTSD was identified. 376
America, in Support of Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence, filed in United States v.
Krutschewski, 541 F. Stipp. 142 (I). Mass. 1982).
3" Cr, No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980). See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
3""
	 States v. Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (I). Mass. 1982).
3"e
	 of Amicus Curiae, supra note 366, at 3.
370 Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.
37] Id .
972 Id .
373
3" In Illinois, for example, the trial court loses jurisdiction 30 days after the last action taken.
ILL. Rev. STAT. Ch. I 10A 606(b) (Smith-Hurd 1976). As a result, motions for modification of
sentence or motion for a new trial may not properly be heard in the trial court after that time. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo, 84 Ill. 20170, 417 N.E.2d, 356 (1981) and People v. Carter, 91 III.
App. 3d 635, 415 N.E.2d 17 (1980).
ors
	 suggested uses of habeas corpus petitions may be found in Note, supra note 6, at 115 - 17
(1979). These applications, however, focus primarily on fitness issues which may not be relevant in
PTSD cases. See ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 § 122-1 et. seq. (Smith-Hurd 1982) for an example of
post-conviction remedies.
376 For examples of successful post-conviction cases, see infra notes 380-392 and accompanying
text.
377
	 infra notes 380-384 and accompanying text.
37' For example, in State v. Jensen, the trial court granted the defendant's post conviction petition
based directly upon such an analysis. No. CR-75687 (Super. Ct., Maricopa County, Ariz. Feb. 17,
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This theory provided the basis for a post-conviction petition filed in a ten-year-old
murder conviction in Arizona. 379 In State v. Jensen, an unreported opinion, the Arizona
Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief on the issue of
PTSD as recently discovered evidence.350 The case was remanded to the trial court for a
hearing concerning whether the failure to introduce PTSD at trial in 1973 would have
had an effect upon the verdict or the sentence?' In that hearing the defense introduced
testimony establishing that the defendant had suffered from PTSD at the time of the
offense.382 Further, the defense introduced testimony from several experts that tended to
show that, prior to the publication of DSM III in 1980, a competent attorney would not.
have been able to establish the relationship between Vietnam service and criminal con-
duct. 3" In addition, there was some indication that experts who testified at the original
trial perceived psychological abnormalities related to Vietnam service. They were not able
1984) (Cantor, J.). Following a hearing lasting several days, the trial court entered the following
findings of fact and conclusion of law:
This matter having been under advisement, the Court makes the following findings:
Based upon the testimony of Drs. Wilson, Yost, Williams and Gray and taking into
consideration also the testimony of Drs. 'Incliner and Cleary, the Court finds that the
mental disorder known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a new diagnostic
category that did not exist in 1973; that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third
Editions (DSM III) was the first recognized authority that defined this term and there-
fore the diagnosis of rrsn could not have been made in 1973. While there is an
overlapping of the common terms as shell shock used after World War 1 and battle
fatigue used after World War 11, the Vietnam War period was a different type of war
and that the stress to the military was of a more intense and different nature.
The Court further finds that more probably than not the defendant suffered from
PTSD since 1973. This finding does not mean that the Court finds that the defendant is
legally insane. This is to be determined by the jury or tryer of the facts.
The Court finds from the testimony that more probably than not the defendant
was in a dissociativelike state. The Court finds that the military records and history of
the defendant were not available in 1973, that some were classified secret and others
could not be obtained within the time of trial.
The Court finds that more probably than not the verdict or sentence might have
been different if the records of the defendant, the diagnostic category of PTSD and the
research as to this disorder had been presented to the jury in 1973.
Therefore, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
Pursuant to Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.1, the Court finds that newly-
discovered material facts exist; that the Court has considered the following:
The probability of such facts, if introduced, would have changed the verdict,
finding or sentence; the diligence which would have been required to discover and
produce the evidence; that the petitioner acted with promptness in commencing a
proceeding after discovery of such new facts; that for the hiregoing reasons,
The Court finds that the conviction and sentence should be vacated.
Id.
3T5 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in State v. Jensen, No. Cr. 75687 (Maricopa County,
Ariz. Feb. 7, 1983)[hereinalter cited as Petition in State v. Jensen].
390
	
Ct. Order No. 2908-2-PC (Sup. Ct., Ariz,. Sept. 22, 1983). But see Miller v. State, 338
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1983) for a case in which post-conviction relief was denied.
38 ' Sup. Ct. Order No. 2908-2-PC (Sup. Ct., Ariz. Sept. 22, 1983).
382 See supra note 378. The author was called as an expert witness for the defense to describe how
PTSD has been used in other cases. The hearing was held on January 16-19, 1984, and resulted in
the conviction and sentence being vacated. Id.
983 Id.
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to explain, however, the relationship between the Vietnam experience and the defen-
dant's behavior at the time of the original proceeding."4
Alternatively, convictions of veterans that occurred after the promulgation of DSM
III by the A PA in which counsel failed to raise PTSD may be attacked on grounds that
competent counsel should have investigated or presented PTSD. 385 It. can be argued that
attorneys who represent veterans fail to provide adequate representation, if they fail to
explore such a widespread disorder as PTSD. The competency-of-counsel argument was
successful in overturning a 1979 conviction that was the subject of another unreported
opinion. In State v. Cohen, a Califbrnia appellate court granted a new trial based upon the
defendant's assertion that the attorney at the previous trial in which the defendant had
been convicted of murder had failed to explore the implications of his Vietnam experi-
ence.386 In 1983, the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter, a lesser offense in a
jury trial in which evidence of PTSD was advanced to explain the defendant's behavior
during the criminal act. 3"
In addition, many jurisdictions require courts to consider factors in mitigation and
aggravation in reaching a sentencing decision. 388 Arguably, a failure to consider PTSD as
a factor either in determining liability or in sentencing may contravene the procedural
rights of the delendant.389 An example of a case in which this strategy was successfully
employed is Slate v. Dobbs?" In Dobbs, attorneys for the defendant argued that failure to
take PTSD into account in sentencing required a new sentencing hearing."' Following
that hearing, the defendant's sentence was reduced from seven-and-a-half years of hard
labor to the three years already served."'
It is important to emphasize that these arguments are intended to serve as a vehicle
for raising the PTSD issue before the trial or appellate court. They are premised on the
assumption that only after the court has had an opportunity to have a full description of
all of the factors related to an offense that a just result. can occur. In a very real sense,
veterans affected by PTSD who have not had that. fact. presented either at trial or
sentencing have not had their day in court. The above suggestions fir appropriately
raising PTSD-related issues on behalf of a client should not, however, at this time be
considered definitive. Attorneys should consider other theories, or undertake legislative
action to ensure that psychological evaluations and PTSD treatment be made available to
all Vietnam veteran defendants.
384 Id .
395 Failure to introduce relevant evidence is often subject to constitutional challenge as a denial
of effective assistance. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 38 § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982). See also People v. Edmonds,
78 Ill. App. 3933, 398 N.E.2d 230 (1979) and People v. Brown. 35 Ill. App. 3d 315, 343 N.E.2d 525
(1976), While, as a matter of law, PTSD has probably not become so widely known that an attorney
can he held liable for failing to present a P-I-SD defense, the issue may provide a basis for presenting
evidence of PTSD to the trial court. See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
356
 Court Order in State v. Jensen, No. 1 Grim. 21566, at 20-23 (Super. Gt. Contra Costa County,
Cal. Nov. 1983).
367 Telephone interview with Joyce B. Ladar, Attorney for the Defendant Cohca, San Francisco,
Cal. (Jan. 26, 1984).
'" See. e.g., 1 . ANN. STAT. ch . 38 § 1005-4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
363 In some cases failure to consider evidence of medical or physical condition when presented
to the court has proved grounds for a new hearing as to sentence. See tyro notes 390 - 91 and
accompanying text.
39° No. 105349 (16th Jud. Dist. Ct., St, Mary Parish, La. 1983).
391 Id.
292
 Telephone interview with Barry Levin, Esq., attorney for Mr. Dobbs, Los Angeles, Cal. (Jan.
31, 1983).
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CONCLUSION
Because the relationship between PTSD and client behavior is only beginning to be
understood, the potential for creative and responsible applications of the disorder is
great. If, as many experts predict, the incidence of PTSD is likely to increase over the next
few years, both attorneys and mental health professionals will have to grapple with the
practical and ethical problems created by this prevalent, war-induced psychological disor-
der. The costs of Vietnam service are far too great to be borne by veterans alone. A big
step in accepting responsibility-as a society for the price of that war is recognition of the
psychological impact that Vietnam had on the men and women who served there, and
application of this new understanding, when appropriate, to the disposition of criminal
cases.
APPENDIX
This legislation, Assembly Bill No. 3723, introduced by Assemblyman Richard Floyd
on Feb. 17, 1984, is presently pending before the California State Assembly.
[PREAMBLEJLEGISLATIVE INTENT]
The Legislature finds that comprehensive recent studies establish that the particular
attributes of the Vietnam War produced significant emotional disabilities among a sub-
stantial number of the men and women who served in the military forces of the United
States in Vietnam; and that the emotional disabilities suffered by these veterans, ranging
from disabling readjustment problems to acute or chronic post traumatic stress disorder,
has resulted in the incarceration of many of them for antisocial behavior.
We further find that there is a need for rehabilitation programs directed to the
specific problems and needs of these individuals, so that they can assimilate into and
become productive members of society; and that the medical community has achieved an
understanding of and ability to treat both substance abuse and psychological problems
unique to Vietnam Veterans.
In view of these findings, and cognizant of the legislative purpose set forth in Penal
Code § 1170(a)( I), the Legislature declares that the rehabilitation of Vietnam Veterans is
an appropriate and compelling goal of the criminal justice system, and enacts the follow-
ing statute[s] in furtherance of that goal.
[FELONY SENTENCING]
1. Upon motion of the defendant of counsel for the defendant, the Court shall, at or
before the imposition of sentence, determine whether the defendant is or was a member
of the military forces of the United States who served in Vietnam. if the Court determines
that the defendant is or was a member of the military forces of the United States who
served in Vietnam, the Court shall order a diagnostic study pursuant to Penal Code §
1203.03.
A. If the written report submitted by the Director of the Department of Corrections,
in accord with Penal Code § 1203.03(b), as well as any additional evidence presented
by the defendant, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. The defendant suffers from substance abuse and/or psychological problems
resulting from service in Vietnam;
2. The defendant is amenable to treatment for the foregoing problem(s); and
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3. The defendant's release from custody does not pose an imminent threat. to
society;
the Court may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, suspend imposition or
execution of sentence, and may direct that such suspension may continue for such period
of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of such sentence upon such conditions
and terms as the Court may deem appropriate in the furtherance of justice, including but
not limited to a term and condition requiring the defendant to participate in an outpa-
tient or inpatient program of treatment approved by the United States Government, or
any agency thereof, the State of California, or any agency thereof, of the Court. The
period of probation and the modification or termination thereof shall be established and
effected in accord with Penal Code §§ 1203 and 1203.1.
B. If the written report submitted by the Director of the Department of Corrections,
as well as any additional evidence presented by the defendant, establishes that:
1. The defendant suffers from substance abuse and/or psychological problems
resulting from service in Vietnam;
2. The defendant is amenable to treatment for the forgoing problem(s); but.
3. The defendant's release from custody does pose an imminent threat to
society,
the Court shall sentence the defendant in accord with applicable provisions of the Penal
Code, and shall further order that the defendant he provided adequate and appropriate
psychiatric or psychological treatment by either the Sheriff of the County in which the
defendant is incarcerated or, if the sentence is a commitment to state prison, the Director
of the Department. of Corrections, and shall require either the Sheriff or the Director of
the Department of Corrections to submit periodic reports, as directed by the Court,
regarding the treatment and rehabilitation of the defendant.
C. Should an individual granted probation for the purpose of treatment pursuant to
subdivision (A) violate any term or condition of probation imposed by the Cou rt, the
Court may modify any term or condition, or revoke the grant of probation and
sentence the defendant as provided in Penal Code § 1203.1.
[MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING]
1. Upon motion of the defendant or counsel for the defendant, the Court shall, at or
before the imposition of sentence, determine whether the defendant is or was a member
of the military forces of the United States who served in Vietnam. If the Court determines
that the defendant is or was a member of the military forces of the United States who
served in Vietnam, the Court shall, if requested by the defendant or counsel for the
defendant, appoint such expert or experts as are necessary to determine:
A. Whether the defendant suffers from substance abuse and/or psychological prob-
lems resulting from service in Vietnam;
B. Whether the defendant is amenable to treatment for the foregoing problem(s), if
any; and
C. Whether the defendant's release from custody does or would pose an imminent
threat to society.
II. If the evaluation performed and submitted in accord with subdivision I, as well as any
additional evidence presented by the defendant, establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
A. The defendant suffers from substance abuse and/or psychological problems
resulting from service in Vietnam;
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B. The defendant is amenable to treatment for the foregoing problem(s); and
C. The defendant's release from custody does not pose an imminent threat to
society,
the Court may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, suspend imposition or
execution of sentence, and may direct that such suspension may continue for such period
of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of such sentence upon such conditions
and terms as the Court may deem appropriate in the furtherance of justice, including but
not limited to a term and condition requiring the defendant to participate in an outpa-
tient program of treatment approved by the United States Government, or any agency
thereof, the State of California, or any agency thereof, or the Court. The period of
probation and the modification or revocation thereof shall be in accord with Penal Code
§§ 1203 and 1203.1.
III. If the evaluation performed and submitted in accord with subdivision I, as well as
any additional evidence presented by the defendant, establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that:
A. The defendant suffers from substance abuse and/or psychological problems
resulting from service in Vietnam;
B. The defendant is amenable to treatment for the foregoing problem(s); but
C. The defendant's release from custody does pose an imminent threat to society,
the Court shall sentence the defendant in accord with applicable provisions of the Penal
Code, and shall further order that the defendant be accorded adequate and appropriate
psychiatric or psychological treatment by the Sheriff of the County in which the defen-
dant is incarcerated.
IV. Should an individual granted probation for the purpose of treatment pursuant to
subdivision E I violate any term or condition of probation imposed by the Court, the Court
may modify any term or condition previously imposed, or revoke probation and sentence
the defendant as provided in Penal Code § 1203.1.
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